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Bertrand Russell once characterized mathematics
as the science in which no one knows what he is
talking about, nor whether what he is saying is true.
Many philosophers, and a few mathematicians, have
attempted to provide accounts of what it is that math-
ematicians are talking about when they do mathematics.
These accounts fall into five major categories: Pla-
tonism or Mathematical Realism, Nominalism, Conceptu-
alism or Constructivism, Logicism, and Psychologism.
Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle is an attempt
to elucidate Aristotle's account of the objects that
mathematicians investigate. The thesis of the disser-
tation is that, though there are elements of Construc-
tivism, and even of Platonism, in Aristotle's account
of mathematical objects, his mathematical ontology is
most accurately classified as a form of Nominalism.
VPsychologism and Logicism are relatively new at-
tempts at providing an ontological foundation for
mathematics, and there is nothing in Aristotle to sug-
gest that his mathematical ontology falls into either
category
.
Constructivism, in a well-developed form, is also
a rather recent development. Nonetheless, there are
passages in Aristotle which suggest that he is in sym-
pathy with a Constructivist account of mathematical
objects. Several recent articles on Aristotle's math-
ematical ontology suggest interpretations which are
distinctly Constructivist in flavor. I argue that,
despite the strains of Constructivism to be found in
some of Aristotle's remarks, Constructivism does not
fit well with Aristotle's general philosophy of sci-
ence, and that he should not be interpreted as offering
a Constructivist ontology for mathematics.
Platonism is dismissed as a possible Aristotelian
ontology, on the basis of Aristotle's lengthy and vehe-
ment arguments against Platonic accounts of number and
figure
.
The dissertation opens with a general discussion of
mathematical ontology. The general features of Aristo-
vi
tslisn science sire described, and I argue that pro~
viding an ontological foundation for an Aristotelian
science involves giving an account of the existence
of the genus which that science investigates. I
then propose a mathematical ontology for Aristotle
which takes as the objects of mathematics particular
quantitative properties of sensible substances. The
dissertation concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's
account of infinity
,
and the consequences of that ac-
count for mathematics.
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INTRODUCTION
Vlll
kittle has been done in the way of systematic
explication of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics.
This is due in part, no doubt, to the widely held
opinion that Aristotle was not himself much of a mathe-
matician. Though he frequently draws on mathematics
examples to illustrate various points he makes
a tout science in general, we do not find in Aristotle's
works original contributions to the development of the
mathematical sciences.
A second factor which discourages speculation about
Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics is the sparsity of
material with which to work. Metaphysics I provides a
fairly thorough discussion of unity and of what it is to
be one, but barely mentions numbers in general. Meta-
physics M and N contain the only protracted discussions
of mathematical issues, but they are concerned primarily
with arguments against various forms of Platonism. Any
positive alternative to the theories of his predecessors
is offered by Aristotle merely as a suggestion in rela-
tively brief and scattered passages. At no point do we
find Aristotle undertaking a clear presentation of a co-
herent overall theory.
IX
But mathematics raises interesting problems as a
science within the context of Aristotle's philosophy.
On the one hand, the mathematical sciences are offered
as paradigms of demonstrative science, the general
features of which Aristotle spells out in the Posterior
Analytics. It follows from the Posterior Analytics dis-
cussion that demonstrative sciences must investigate ex-
istent objects. On the other hand, Aristotle's Metaphys-
ics takes as its central tenet the claim that all that
exists are sensible substances and the modifications of
sensible substances. (One noteworthy exception to this
view is the existence of first movers, which are non-
sensible substances. But while mathematical laws may
apply to first movers, the first movers are not at any
rate the sole or proper subject matter of mathematics).
The question then arises, how can a science as abstract
as mathematics apparently is, be given a concrete, exis-
tent subject matter with which to deal? It is my pur-
pose in this dissertation to answer that question.
Chapter one simply sets out the problem to be solved,
and briefly discusses some previous interpretations of
Aristotle's views on the existence of numbers and geo-
metric objects.
XChapter two offers a general description of Ari-
stotle’s account of demonstrative science. I focus on
Jaakko Hintikka's account of Aristotelian science offered
in his paper, "On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Sci-
ence
,
and on two replies to that paper, one by Gareth
Matthews and one by Lynn Rose. Matthews argues, success-
fully I think, that Hintikka's account of Aristotelian
science is seriously defective. But for my purposes, the
important element in Hintikka's description of Aristotel-
ian science is the notion that a demonstrative science
assumes the existence of the subject genus for that sci-
ence, and I argue that Matthews' objections do not touch
on that aspect of Hintikka's account. Rose objects spe-
cifically to the idea that a science assumes, rather than
proves, the existence of its subject genus. I argue that
whatever the merits of Rose's own proposal as a method-
olcjy for science, it will not do as an interpretation
of Aristotle's views on the structure of demonstrative
science. I conclude, with Hintikka, that one essential
element in a demonstrative science is the assumption of
the existence of the subject genus which that science
investigates. The problem of providing ontological foun-
dations for mathematics then centers on an account of the
existence of the subject-genera for Arithmetic and Geo-
me try
.
XI
Chapter three takes up the problem of finding the
subject-genus of Arithmetic. Various alternatives are
considered and rejected, and Number is finally settled
on as the genus of that science. I then offer an account
of the existence of numbers as properties of collections,
propose solutions to various objections that have been
raised to such accounts, (most notably, those raised by
Gottlob Frege in The Foundations of Arithmetic ) , and
discuss the strictures which such an account places on
certain Arithmetical operations, such as addition and
multiplication. Finally, I propose an account of the
differentiae of the species of Number, and attempt to
show why it is that counting the things in a collection
tells us what numerical property that collection has.
In chapter four
,
I argue that an interpretation of
Aristotle which takes Geometric Figure as the genus of
Geometry is unacceptable. I consider in detail Ian
Mueller's paper, "Aristotle on Geometric Objects", and
take issue with his interpretation at various points. I
propose that the genus which Geometry investigates is
Extension, and that its species are One-, Two-, and Three-
dimensional Extension. I conclude with a discussion of
the existence and nature of geometric figures, such as
triangles, cubes, etc.
Xll
Chapter five is concerned with Aristotle's account
of infinity. The aim here is primarily one of exposi-
tion, and I rely heavily on Hintikka's paper, "Aristo-
telian Infinity", for that purpose. I point out the con-
sequences of Aristotle
' s views on infinity for both Arith-
metic and Geometry. Finally, I argue that Hintikka's ef-
forts to show that Geometry is deficient given Aristotle's
views on infinity are unsuccessful.
I have relied primarily on the Oxford translation of
Aristotle's works, and all quotations are taken from that
translation, unless otherwise indicated.
1CHAPTER I
MATHEMATICAL ONTOLOGY
In both the Metaphysics and the Posterior Analy-
tics^ Aristotle characterizes science as the investiga-
tion of the essential nature of some subject matter:
Every demonstrative science investigates,
with regard to some subject matter, the
essential attributes, from the common o-
pinions
.
(Met. B, 997al9 - 21)
Every demonstrative science has three ele-
ments: (1) that which it posits, the sub-ject genus whose essential attributes it
investigates
. .
.
(Post . An.
,
In chapter two, I shall argue that sciences are indi-
viduated on the basis of their respective subject gen-
era: an individual science is concerned with the in-
vestigation of some one specific genus. For the moment,
my concern is merely to point out the close connection
for Aristotle between knowledge of essential nature,
which is the goal of science, and the existence of that
whose essential nature is known.
That there is a dependence of our knowledge of any
thing's essential nature on the existence of that thing
is argued for most carefully in chapters seven and eight
2of Book B of the Posterior Analytics
. Aristotle repeat-
edly emphasizes that knowledge of the essential nature
of what does not exist is impossible:
To put it another way: how shall we by
definition prove essenti al nature : he who
knows what human - or any other - nature is
,
must know also that man exists; for no one'
knows the nature of what does not exist -
one can know the meaning of the phrase or
name 'goat-stag' but not what the essential
nature of a goat-stag is.
(Post . An .
,
92b3 - 7)
We cannot apprehend a thing's definable form
without apprehending that it exists, since
we cannot know its essential nature while we
are ignorant whether it exists.
(Post . An . , 93al9)
Since a science investigates essential nature, and the
essential nature of what does not exist is not knowable,
it is clear that a viable science requires an existent
subject matter. But this requirement is certainly mini-
mal, and does not seem to narrow significantly the pos-
sibilities from which to choose a mathematical ontology.
For example, Mathematical Platonism, sometimes called
"Mathematical Realism", easily satisfies the requirement
that the objects investigated by mathematics exist. Given
a Platonic ontology, the mathematical sciences investigate
the essential natures of abstract, non-sensible
,
and (on
most Platonic theories) eternally existent objects that
are apprehended solely by the intellect. Geometry inves-
3tigates the essential natures of triangles, cubes, and
the like, which really exist in a non-physical realm,
quite independently of the mind which reasons about them.
Similarly, numbers, which are investigated by Arithmetic,
are non-sensible objects whose existence is in no way de-
pendent upon the existence of minds. if one adopts a
Platonic ontology for mathematics, there is no difficulty
in satisfying the Posterior Analytics requirement that
mathematics investigate an existent subject matter.
But, of course. Platonism will not do as an ontology
for mathematics within the context of Aristotle's meta-
physics. In the Metaphysics
, Aristotle argues repeatedly
and at considerable length against not only the Theory of
Forms, but also against many formulations of Mathematical
Platonism. Indeed, he takes pains to exhaust the possible
interpretations of claims like "Numbers are independently
existent non— sensible entities", and to show that on none
of these interpretations is the claim acceptable. (cf.
particularly Metaphysics M) . Thus, the import of the re-
striction placed on science by the Posterior Analytics
can not be fully appreciated unless viewed in conjunction
with Aristotle's metaphysical position.
Constructivism may be characterized loosely as the
view that the objects of mathematics are simply concepts
4produced by the mind. As such, the objects of mathe-
matics are clearly dependent for their existence on the
existence of minds, which produce or construct them.
Several recent attempts to explicate Aristotle's
mathematical ontology provide interpretations which con-
tain a strong Constructivist strain. Jaakko Hintikka,
in his paper "Aristotelian Infinity", 1 says:
What is also clear is that Aristotle repeat-
insists that actualization in one's mindis in principle as good a sort of actualiza-
any other. Aristotle wants to apply
his principle that "everything comes out of
that which actually is" (De Anima, III. 7,
4 31a3-4 ) to artificial products like houses...
The obvious connection between these passages
and Aristotle's discussion of the temporal
priority of the actual in Metaphysics IX, 8,
1049bl8-29 shows that the thought (or image)
which one has in one 1 s mind when one knows x
is for Aristotle as fully actual an instance
of the form of x as an external object exem-
plifying this form.
This parity of actualization in thought
with actualization in external reality is
;
what leads me to say that for Aristotle con-
ceivability implied actualizability
. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, to conceive of a form in
one's mind was ipso facto to actualize it.
This idea is also applied by Aristotle to
mathematical entities. They exist only in
thinking, but since thinking is an actuality,
they are not any less real for this reason.
Mathematical entities seem to be concepts produced or
constructed by the mind. They exist, and are properly a
1. Hintikka, Jaakko. "Aristotelian Infinity", Phil Rev,
vo 1 . LXXV
,
1966. Pages 197 - 218.
5subject for scientific investigation, but they exist only
in the mind. Any putative mathematical entity which can-
not be conceived or pictured by the mind, (an infinite
extension, for example, or a set with infinite cardinal-
ity)
,
is not legitimately an object to be investigated
by science, because it does not exist and therefore its
essential nature can not be known.
In his influential paper, "Aristotle on Geometrical
Objects', Ian Mueller argues that geometric figures are
objects which are the result of imposing geometric proper-
ties, such as triangularity, on intelligible matter, which
Mueller takes to be spatial extension. Though Mueller
does not commit himself explicitly on the nature of this
"imposition" of properties, it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that the imposition is carried out by the mind. For
Aristotle repeatedly asserts that no physical object sat-
isfies the geometer's definitions: an iron bar does not
touch a brass sphere at a point, ( 998a5 ) . If these
geometric properties are not stamped on intelligible mat-
ter by nature, if geometric figures are no where to be
found in the physical world, it is reasonable to suppose
that it is the mind which does the stamping, and that the
objects which result exist only in the realm of thought.
2. Mueller, Ian. "Aristotle on Geometrical Objects",
Archiv fOr Geschichte der Philosophie
,
vol. LII, 1970.
6Finally, m a work still in progress, Julia Annas
ascribes to Aristotle an account of number which also
makes these mathematical entities mind-dependent. Though
at one point she argues that Aristotle is not a Construc-
tivist, she encapsulates her interpretation of Aristotle's
account of number as follows:
Aristotle | s concept of number, in making num-ber relative to what is numbered, ties numberfirmly to counting, making it analytic that
number is what we count with. This is a suit-
ably anti
-Platonis tic theory: numbers do not
exist independently of us and our activities
of counting.
If Annas is correct then, for Aristotle, numbers do not
exist anywhere but in the mind. While they may have ap-
plication to things in the physical world, (they can be
used to count things in that world)
,
they are not them-
selves things in that world: they are neither physical
objects nor properties of physical objects. They exist
only as conceptual tools in the mind of someone who
counts
.
Hintikka's interpretation is perhaps the least non-
committal in its consignment of the objects of mathemat-
ics to the realm of thought, but all three of these pro-
posals seem to grant the mind some indispensable role in
7producing and maintaining the existence of the objects
of mathematics. If Hintikka is correct, and the actuali-
zation of a form in thought is on a par, onto logically
,
with the actualization of that form in some physical ob-
ject, there may be no objection, from the point of view
° f the Posterior Analytics
,
to having a science which in-
vestigates the essential nature of purely mental entities.
One might look to Metaphysics L for support for the
claim that mathematical entities exist only in thought.
Aristotle says:
For to be an act of thinking and to be
an object of thought are not the same thing.
We answer that in some cases the knowledge
is the object. In the productive sciences
it is the substance or essence of the ob-
ject, matter omitted, and in the theoretical
sciences the definition or the act of think-
ing is the object.
(Met . L, 1074b37 ff)
Th. s passage is rather obscure, and I do not profess to
know precisely what Aristotle is getting at here. He
might be proposing some distinction of senses of 'think-
ing about'
. He might be distinguishing cases where what
the mind thinks about is something other than the thought
of that thing, from cases where the thought of a thing
and the thing thought of are one and the same. In the
former case, which apparently arises in the productive
sciences, there is an object, x, and a mental event, the
8act of thinking of x or of having the thought of x, which
is the act of the mind's adopting the form of x. Because
the mind adopts the form of x, it is thinking about X/
and there is something distinct from the mind and its ac-
tivity which the mind is thinking about. In the latter
case / which arises in the theoretical sciences, there is
no object distinct from the thought itself. There is only
the mind's adoption of a form, which is not a form had by
anything else, except perhaps by another mind thinking
the same thought. To say that the mind is thinking about
an object in this case is not to say that there is an ob-
ject distinct from the mind whose form the mind has adopt-
ed, but rather simply that the mind has adopted a certain
form. The thought, and the object thought about (in this
sense), are the same.
if Aristotle is proposing anything like this, and as-
serting that in the case of theoretical sciences, the
thought and the object of thought are always the same,
then the passage supports a Constructivist interpretation
of Aristotle's mathematical ontology. For mathematics is
a theoretical science. If the objects which mathematicians
think about and investigate simply are thoughts, then it
seems that the objects of mathematics exist only in the
realm of thought, and that they are completely mind-depen-
dent.
9There is a problem with this line of reasoning,
however. Physics is included as a theoretical science
along with mathematics and theology. Yet it is im-
plausible in the extreme to suppose that Aristotle
thought that his philosophy of nature investigated
purely mental entities. And if one supposes that the
objects of Arithmetic and Geometry are mentally depen-
dent in some stronger sense than are the objects of
Physics, one is left puzzling over the inclusion of
Astronomy as a mathematical science. Surely the objects
investigated by astronomers are more akin to those in-
vestigated by physicists than to entities constructed
by the mind. If the objects of Arithmetic and Geometry
the latter, one would reasonably expect Aristotle
to classify Astronomy with Physics, rather than with
mathematics
.
Furthermore, if we accept a Constructivist ontology
of mathematics as an interpretation of Aristotle, his
remark in the Posterior Analytics regarding the term
'goat-stag' is difficult to understand, (see page 2, a-
bove) . If mathematics can discover the essential nature
of entities which are nothing more than concepts formed
by the mind, what precludes us from obtaining knowledge
of the essential nature of goat-stags? If the mental
instantiation of a form is on the same ontological foot-
10
mg as its instantiation in a physical object, then it
would seem that, given that I can form an image of a
goat-stag since I know the meaning of the term, the es-
sential nature of goat-stags is every bit as accessible
as that of cows. At the very least, it is as accessible
that of mathematical entities
.
Finally
,
a Constructivist ontology seems to violate
the spirit, if not the letter, of Aristotle's philosophy
of science. An objection which he consistently levels
against both the Theory of Forms and Platonic ontologies
of mathematics is that they are devoid of explanatory
power. There is no reason to suppose that knowledge of
entities which have an eternal, abstract existence is in
any way connected to knowledge of the physical world.
Postulating a form, Redness, brings us no closer to an
explanation of why physical objects are red. It is not
easy to see how a Constructivist ontology of mathematics
fares any better from this point of view. Why is it
that knowledge of concepts constructed by the mind, con-
cepts which are not of anything outside the mind, has
application to the physical world?
It seems to me, then, that it is misleading to place
a very heavy emphasis on those passages in Aristotle
which suggest a Constructivist ontology. What, then, is
to be made of the passage from Metaphysics L? First, as
11
I have pointed out, it seems that any significance which
that passage has for determining Aristotle's ontology
for mathematics, it also has for determining his ontolo-
gy for Physics. I am no more tempted to describe Ari-
stotle as a Constructivist, on the basis of that rather
obscure passage, than I am tempted to describe him as
an Idealist.
Some light may be shed on the Metaphysics L passage
by an apparently similar claim put forward in De_ Anima:
The so-called abstract objects the mind
thinks just as, if one had thought of the
snub-nosed not as snub-nosed but as hollow,
one would have thought of an actuality with-
out the flesh in which it is embodied : it
thus that the mind when it is thinking
the objec i_s of mathematics thinks as separ —
ate
,
elements which do not exist separate.
In every case the mind which is actively
thinking is the objects which it thinks.
(De Anima III. 7, 431bl3-17)
As I understand him, Aristotle is here suggesting that
mathematicians are reasoning about entities whose exis-
tence is inseparably bound up with the existence of sen-
sible substances. The mathematician investigates the
essential nature of entities which exist only as modifi-
cations of substances. But to facilitate his investiga-
tion, the mathematician ignores the substance in which
the entity is embodied, and thinks of the entity as
though it existed separately. Mathematical entities
12
exist separately, then, only in thought. But mathe-
matics no more investigates entities with a purely mental
existence than does Physics. The physicist considers
sensible substances merely gua moveable, and ignores
every other aspect of them. That which is moveable-and-
nothing-else exists only in the mind, just as that which
is extended- and -nothing-else exists only in the mind.
But neither Physics nor Geometry is investigating the
essential nature of entities that have a purely mental
existence. They are investigating the essential nature
of modifications of sensible substances.
This interpretation is supported by Metaphysics M.3:
* * • Since it is true to say without cruali-
fication that not only things which are
separable but also things which are insep-
arable exist, (for instance, that mobiles
exist)
,
it is also true to say without
gualification that the objects of mathe-
matics exist, and with the character a-
scribed to them by Mathematicians. And as
it is true to say of the other sciences too
without qualification that they deal with
such and such a subject - not with what is
accidental to it, (e.g. not with the pale,
if the healthy thing is pale, and the sci-
ence has healthy as its subject)
,
but with
that which is the subject of each science -
with the healthy if it treats its object
qua healthy, with man if qua man; so too
is it with geometry; if its subjects hap-
pen to be sensible, though it does not
treat of them qua sensible, the mathematic-
al sciences will not for that reason be
sciences of sensibles - nor, on the other
hand, of other things separate from sensibles.
(Met. M, 10 77b31 - 78a5)
13
In the chapters which follow, I will offer an in-
terpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics
which is much more closely aligned with Nominalism than
with Constructivism. Nominalism is the most conservative
of metaphysical positions, postulating the existence of
entities only when those entities are absolutely essen-
tial to a satisfactory explanatory theory. Nominalists
do not countenance the existence of universals, and, in
general, do not countenance the existence of abstract ob-
jects of any sort whatever, (Nelson Goodman is a notable
exception to this latter point). Mathematics, for Ari-
stotle, will be construed as a science investigating the
essential natures of particular quantitative properties
of sensible substances. To be sure, there will be hints
of Constructivism along the way. Geometric figures will
be construed as purely mental entities, but I will argue
they are merely conceptual tools used to facilitate
the investigation of extension - the extendedness of
physical objects. I will also point out that Aristotle
would adopt an essentially Constructivist position with
regard to the possibility of transfinite mathematics.
But taken as a whole, the interpretation which I shall
offer is Nominalistic in tenor.
14
CHAPTER II
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE
There are a number of questions which we must con-
sider in some detail before attempting to solve certain
problems of existence more or less peculiar to mathe-
as an Aristotelian science.
In answering the question, 'What is a science?',
two distinct elements must be taken into account. One
is a characterization of a method of inquiry: some
criteria ought to be provided which an investigation
must satisfy if it is to qualify as a scientific in-
vestigation. The second element involves the body of
propositions or beliefs which make up the science, and
the criteria which a given set of beliefs must satisfy
in order to be correctly described as a science. I
shall consider the first of these elements later in this
chapter, in a discussion of the role of syllogisms in
science. For the moment, my concern will be the criteria
which determine whether a given set of propositions qual-
ifies as a science, and this will involve subsidiary is-
sues regarding the object of scientific knowledge and the
individuation of a body of scientific knowledge as a sci-
ence .
15
Metaphysics A opens with a brief genealogy of
knowledge. There, art (C«XvV ) and science
)
are contrasted with experience
: the for-
mer involve understanding and are concerned with uni-
versal judgements and with the reasons why something is
the case; the latter is concerned exclusively with
particulars, and is content with the knowledge that
something is the case. So one may learn by experience
that this A will produce a particular B, but one who
possesses the art or science appropriate to A's and B's
wiH know also why A produces B.
Posterior Analytics seems to offer a second,
distinct criterion distinguishing art and science from
experience. The Metaphysics proposes that art arises
from experience when universal judgements about classes
of objects are drawn from particular experiences: "Now
arises when from many notions gained by experience
one universal judgement about a class of objects is pro-
duced
, (9 81a 5 ) . The Poster ior Analytics emphasizes
knowledge of the causes of a thing as the important char-
acteristic of scientific or artistic knowledge. It may
be thought that these criteria will pick out different
classes of judgements as falling under art or science.
For example, a physician might well know the universal
proposition that circular wounds heal quickly, but not
16
have the slightest idea why they do. if we adopt the
apparently weaker criterion of art and science, he will
have artistic or scientific knowledge, simply because
he knows the universal proposition in question. If, on
the other hand, we adopt the apparently stronger cri-
terion, that scientific or artistic knowledge is know-
ledge of the reason why, it would seem that the phys-
ician does not have scientific or artistic knowledge.
It would be a mistake, however, to take "reason why"
in a sense strong enough to produce this result. For
Aristotle, a perfectly acceptable answer to the question
Why is X a Y?
,
is an answer to the effect that X is a
Z, and Z's are Y's. Indeed, for Aristotle, the best
possible answer to the question "Why is X a Y?", is one
which asserts that X's are G's, where G is a genus having
Y, or Y-ness, as part of its essential nature. Thus Ari-
stotle is not hesitant to describe the physician as know-
i n<
rT the reason why some particular circular wound will
heal quickly.
It should be pointed out that not any universal prop-
osition will count either as artistic or as scientific
knowledge. First of all, of course, the universal judge-
ment must be true. The physician might assert that this
wound will heal quickly because it was inflicted on a
17
Cypriot, and Cypriots heal quickly. Supposing that
generalization to be false, the physician would not be
practicing the medical art at all, in Aristotle's view,
even if the treatment he prescribed were precisely ap-
propriate to the injury. More interestingly, a univers-
al judgement falls within an art or science only if it
is the broadest generalization of a given instance. For
example, if the physician believes that it is because
this wound was inflicted with an ice-pick that it will
heal quickly, he again fails to practice the medical art.
For this wound will heal quickly, not because it was in-
flicted with an ice-pick, but because ice-pick wounds
are circular, and circular wounds heal quickly. This
requirement Aristotle calls "commensurate universality",
and I shall have more to say of it later.
Scientific or artistic judgements about a particular
case, then, are judgements that that case falls under a
certain general principle, that general principle being
the broadest true generalization of which the given par-
ticular case is an instance. But if both art and science
are distinguished from experience on the ground that they
deal with universals, on what basis is science (klfur£’?/'>?)
distinguished from art ( 'tV>V>9 )?
18
Aristotle does not draw a distinction between art
and science in Metaphysics A, but he does distinguish
art from science in the Nichomachean Ethics: "There-
fore, the object of scientific knowledge is of necessi-
ty... Scientific knowledge, then, is a state of capa-
city to demonstrate", (E.N., 1139b22 - 35). Scientific
knowledge of a proposition seems to require that one
have the ability to produce a demonstration
)
of a certain sort which has that proposition as its con-
clusion. (In fact, this requirement can not hold for all
propositions of which one can have scientific knowledge,
since the basic truths of each science are indemonstra-
ble.) On the other hand, "... art is identical with a
state of capacity to make, involving a true course of
reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being,
that is, with contriving and considering how something
may come into being which is capable of either being or
not being... for art is concerned neither with things
that are, or come into being, necessarily, nor with
things that do so in accordance with nature..." (E.N.,
1140a9 - bl4 )
.
Notice the emphasis on capacities in these accounts
:
both science and art are abilities to do certain sorts of
19
things. it is on the differences in the sorts of things
one does that emphasis must be laid in distinguishing
art from science, and not on features of the bodies of
knowledge involved. There is the claim that the objects
of science exist necessarily, whereas the objects of art
exist contingently: an example of the former might be
one of the elements, of the latter, a house, chair, or
some other artifact. But such a distinction is not ade-
quate to distinguish the body of knowledge constituting
a science from that constituting an art. The object of
a science is that about which we have knowledge, and it
exists necessarily, (either by logical or by natural
necessity). The object of an art is that which is pro-
duced, using the knowledge which constitutes the art,
and that object exists contingently, because it might
have happened that an object of that kind never was
produced. But it does not follow from this that the ob-
ject of the knowledge involved in the art exists only
contingently. Indeed, the capacity to build seems to
presuppose an extensive knowledge of the very proposi-
tions demonstrated by natural science. One can not
distinguish science from art on the ground that one con-
sists of propositions of a certain sort, and the other
consists of propositions of a different sort, because it
seems that the same propositions will be part of both
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science and art. Rather, the distinction seems to be
very close to that which we draw between pure science and
applied science. It is not that the propositions them-
selves differ in kind, but rather the way in which we em-
ploy those propositions, that distinguishes art from sci-
ence. Science uses knowledge of its propositions to dem-
onstrate other propositions, art uses knowledge of its
propositions to make things.
In chapter three of Metaphysics E
, (1025b25), Ari-
stotle does not distinguish art from science at all. in-
stead, he distinguishes three kinds of science: theoret-
ical science, practical science, and productive science.
The account of productive science coincides with the
Ethics account of art, whereas the theoretical sciences
are those which, in the narrower sense of the Ethics, are
simply sciences. Both involve knowledge, but the end of
each kind differs from the others: the end of scienti-
fic knowledge is knowledge : the theoretical sciences are
ends in themselves, and if their propositions are used at
all, it is only in the pursuit of further knowledge. The
end of the productive sciences, or the arts, is again the
making of things. The end of practical science is the
determination of action.
Mathematics, along with natural science and theology,
is a theoretical science. Scientific knowledge in the
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strict sense, we have seen, is a state of capacity to
demonstrate. The theoretical sciences, then, will be
first of all demonstrative, so our discussion hereafter
will be confined to a characterization of the general
features of demonstrative science.
Science is distinguished from art in that its end
is knowledge. But knowledge of what? in Metaphysics B,
Aristotle says: "Every demonstrative science investi-
gates, with regard to some subject matter, the essential
attributes, from the common opinions," (997al9). in the
Posterior Analytics, however, we find: "We suppose our-
selves to have unqualified scientific knowledge of a
thing... when we know the cause on which the fact depends,
as the cause of that fact and no other..." (71b8 - 12).
Again, "We think we have scientific knowledge when we know
the cause, and there are four causes: (1) the definable
form, (2) an antecedent which necessitates a consequent,
(3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause", (94a20).
If we take the goal of science to be scientific know-
ledge of particular things, these accounts differ. For
the essential attributes of a thing have to do with its
formal cause, yet the Posterior Analytics includes not
only this, but the final, material, and efficient causes
as well, as objects of scientific inquiry. Thus the Post-
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erior Analytics gives a broader account of the purpose
of a demonstrative science than does the Metaphysics
.
We can avoid this difficulty if we distinguish two
senses for each of the terms 'scientific object' and
'object of a science'. I shall argue that a particular
science is concerned primarily with the essential attri-
butes of some genus, and that it is this genus which is
the object of the science in the primary sense. It is
this scientific object whose essential attributes the
science investigates, and it is knowledge of these essen-
tial attributes which is first and foremost the goal of
the science. Knowledge of these essential attributes is
obtained by investigating particular objects, both within
and outside of this genus, and the species which fall un-
der the genus, and discovering the various causes of
those objects. These particular objects are objects of
the science in an incidental sense, in so far as they are
objects which the science examines to obtain the knowledge
which is its end. Scientific demonstrations proving that
species have certain properties will, as Aristotle puts
it, exhibit" the essential nature of the genus. Thus,
acquiring scientific knowledge of particulars is not the
end of science, but merely a step toward that end, which
is knowledge of the essential nature of some genus.
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Consider, for example, a science of color. The end
of this science is knowledge of the essential nature of
the genus Color. Knowledge of that essential nature win
be acquired, however, by investigation of the various
species of Color: Red, Blue, etc. But knowledge of those
species will in turn depend upon the investigation of var-
ious colored objects. Discovering the essential nature of
Color will require the investigation of substances, the
material causes of substances, (glass, wood, etc.), the
interaction of surfaces with light, etc. Knowledge of the
causes of substances is not the proper end of the science
of Color, because substances do not fall under the genus
Color. Nonetheless, substances are in a sense objects of
the science, in so far as the investigation of substances
is necessary for the discovery of the essential nature of
Color. But there is an important difference between this
loose sense of 'object of a science'
,
and the sense in
which the genus of a science is the object of the science,
for it is knowledge of the essential nature of the genus
only which is the end of the science.
In the Posterior Analytics we find a brief character-
ization of demonstrative science which makes clear the im-
portance of the genus as the subject the investigation of
which is the concern of the science: Every demonstrative
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science has three elements: (1) that which it posits,
the subject genus whose essential attributes it inves-
tigates, (2) the so-called axioms, primary premisses
of its demonstrations; (3) the attributes, the meaning
(but not the existence) of which it assumes", (76bl2).
Moreover, it is on the basis of the genus with which
a science is concerned that the science is individuated:
"A single science is one whose domain is a single genus",
(87a37 ) . That this genus which individuates the science
is the central concern of that science is suggested in
the Metaphysics: "Therefore to investigate the essential
attributes of one class of things, starting from one set
of beliefs, is the business of one science", (997a20).
The end of a demonstrative science is clearly the
knowledge of the essential nature of some genus. But '
v iat role does syllogism play in demonstrative science?
There can be no doubt that a demonstrative science does
not demonstrate that certain attributes are essential to
the genus with which it is concerned, because demonstra-
tion of essential nature is impossible, (cf. chapters
seven through nine of the Posterior Analytics ) . Nonethe-
less, it is through syllogism that essential nature is
exhibited. There is disagreement over precisely how the
syllogism functions in exhibiting essential nature, and
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how it functions as a tool of science. Let us now con-
sider some of these varying interpretations.
In "On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science", 3
Jaakko Hintikka characterizes syllogisms along the lines
presented in the Prior Analytics
. A syllogism is pro-
duced by inserting a term as the "middle" between two
other terms, this middle term being such that its exten-
sion stands as superset to the extension of one of the
original terms, and as subset to the extension of the
other. One can insert further middle terms, producing
a syllogistic chain which expresses the relation holding
among the elements of a nested sequence of sets.
A particular science is one which deals with an in-
dividual genus, and this genus, according to Hintikka,
functions as the universal set or domain for the science
in question. That is, the genus is not itself a proper
subset of any set with which the science is concerned,
and every set with which the science is concerned is a
subset of the genus. The ideal of a completed science,
on Hintikka' s interpretation, is the setting out of se-
quences of nested sets such that: (1) for each species
falling under the subject-genus, there is a nested sequence
3. Hintikka, Jaakko. "On the Ingredients of an Aristo-
telian Science", Nous
,
vol. VI, 1972. Pages 55 - 69.
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of supersets terminating with the genus; (2) for any
such nested sequence, if A immediately follows B in the
sequence, then there is no set C such that C could be
inserted in the sequence between A and B without destroy-
ing the nested structure of the sequence. (This property
can only be included provided some doctrine of natural
kinds is taken into account. Unless A has only one more
element than B, we can always construct a set C falling
between A and B which preserves the nested structure of
the sequence, simply by adding one element of A to B.
But these sequences are supposed to reflect the species-
genus relationship, and presumably the rather artificial
set C would not be a species falling under the genus of
the science, since there would be no essence picking out
the elements of C.)
If we had a complete Aristotelian Zoology, given
Hintikka's interpretation, then we would have a nested
sequence of sets picked out by the predicates: Man,
Primate
,
Mammal
,
. . . Animal
. We would have a similar
sequence for each species of animal, and every such se-
quence would terminate with the genus Animal. Moreover,
none of these sequences would have any gaps in them: for
example, there would be no natural-kind term T which
picked out a set S such that every Primate was an S and
every S was a Mammal.
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Hintikka calls the relationship holding between an
element in such a nested sequence of natural kinds and
its successor an "atomic connection", because no middle
can be found which connects the two. Derivatively, if
the extensions of two terms are atomically connected, we
may say that the terms are atomically connected. The
statement 'All A's are B's\ where 'A' and 'B' are atom-
ically connected terms, is one kind of immediate premiss.
Each set in one of these sequences corresponds to
some species or sub-species of the subject-genus of the
science. To prove that all A's are C's, according to
Hintikka, one constructs a syllogistic chain, each prem-
iss of which asserts an atomic connection between two
sets, beginning with A and terminating with C. Thus:
where 'A and 'B^ are atomically
connected
.
where 'B^ and 'B^ are atomically
connected
All A's are B^'s
All B^ ' s are B^ '
s
AH B
n
's are C's where V and 'c‘ are atomically
connected.
A completed science, then, would be a set of such chains
linking every lowest species to the subject genus of the
science, through all of the appropriate superordinate
species
.
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It is Hintikka's view that only in the case of the
subject-genus of a science is existence assumed. For
each narrower term or species name, „e assume only the
meaning of that term. The existence of the things which
fall within the extension of that term follows from the
fact that they fall under the subject-genus. For example,
in zoology we assume the existence of animals. We then
assume the meaning of a term, 'horse' for example, and
m demonstrating that horses are animals by providing
a syllogistic chain linking 'horse' to 'animal', we at
the same time prove that horses exist, because animals
do. Thus the justification of the ontological founda-
tions of any particular science, on Hintikka's account,
centers on the existence of the subject-genus of that
science, because the existence of all of the species and
individuals falling under that genus follows from the
existence of the genus.
Various objections have been raised to Hintikka's
account of the structure of a science and the role of
syllogisms in scientific explanation. Gareth Matthews,
in a response to Hintikka entitled "Aristotelian Explana-
4tion
,
finds fault with the use of nested sets as a
4. Matthews, Gareth B., "Aristotelian Explanation".
Unpublished manuscript.
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characterization of scientific explanation. He agrees
with Hintikka that the discussion of syllogisms in the
—
1°r
- —
iLytlCS would lead one to expect explanations
to utilize mediating terms: terms whose extensions
fall between the extension of the subject term and the
extension of the term predicated of it. But, he points
out, the Posterior Analytics raises the unlooked-for
requirement of commensurate universality 5
: if A is C
because A is B, then 'B' and 'C must be co-extensional
,
and, what is more, 's' and 'C must be so related inten-
sionally that if A is C because A is B, then it is not
the case that A is B because A is C. in the Posterior
Analytics
,
then, explanation is not a purely extensional
relationship. Since
'
B
' and ' C' are co-extensional, a
correct Aristotelian explanation of why A is C will not
make use of nested terms in the way suggested by Hintikka.
I1 itthews calls Hintikka 's nested-term explanations
mediating explanations", and explanations resting on
commensurate universality "first-subject explanations",
(the latter being derived from the fact that when B and
C satisfy the two conditions stated, B will be what Ari-
5. Aristotle actually uses the simple 1
,
"univer-
sal", in his Posterior Analytics discussion of this
requirement, but it is clear that universality alone
is not the requirement he has in mind. It is not e-
nough that all B's are C's: it is necessary that
all and only B's are C's, as the discussion at Post-
erior Analytics 73b30 - 74a4 makes clear.
stotle calls the "first subject" of C)
.
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To spell out the first-subject theory of explana-
tion more fully: we have a sequence of terms, A
± .
. . A
such that the extensions of these terms are nested. For
each A
i , there is a set of predicates such that A^ is the
first subject of each of those predicates. For any A.,
where j is less than or equal to i, and B
i , where EL is
one of the predicates of which A. is the first subject,
the proper Aristotelian explanation for A^ ’ s being is
that A_. is an A
±
. (Notice that this yields the result
that an A., is B
±
simply in virtue of being an A. - it is
qua A. that A. is B.).l i i
Matthews offers two arguments to show that first-
subject explanations are preferable to mediating explana-
tions. He argues first that the first-subject approach
will guarantee uniqueness of the cause of A's being C,
given only the reasonable assumption that C will have
only one first subject. The mediating explanation, on
the other hand, allows for non-uniqueness in two ways:
first, there will be more than one reason for A's being
C, provided that there is a species D superordinate or
subordinate to B, superordinate to A, and subordinate to
C. That is, if we have the sequence A:B:D:C, in order of
increasing generality, then 'A is C because A is D' will
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be every bit as acceptable an explanation as 'A is C
because A is B'. 'Man is an animal because man is a
vertebrate' serves as an explanation of man's animal-
ity every bit as well as, and no better than, 'man is
an animal because man is a mammal'.
Non-uniqueness of explanation also arises in a
somewhat different form from co-ordinate species: if
B and B* are species of Cy then something may be a C
either because it is a B or because it is a B*. Some-
thing is a mammal either because it is a man, or be-
cause it is a horse, or because ... There are any num-
ber of reasons why something might be a mammal. Notice,
however, that we do not get non-uniqueness in an explana-
tion of why some specified A's are C's, since for any
particular species A, A's will be C ' s because they are
B s or because they are B*'s, but one and only one of
these explains why A's are C's. This is because our
sequences are nested, so it can not be the case that A's
are C's for both reasons: either all A's are B's or all
A's are B*'s. Non-uniqueness arises from co-ordinate
species only when one asks "What is it to be a C?"
Matthews' second argument against Hintikka points
out that mediating explanations of the sort proposed are
either trivial or false. Suppose that mallards are ducks
of a certain sort. Then the explanation "This is a duck
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because it is a mallard" is trivial, if we ignore the
qualification "of a certain sort". For it reduces to
"This is a duck because it is a duck". But, Matthews
claims, including the differentia in the explanation
yields something false: what makes something a duck
is what is common to all species of ducks, not what
differentiates a single species.
The alternatives offered by Hintikka and Matthews
may appear to be more similar than in fact they are.
Hintikka surely emphasizes the whole-part relationship
in the premisses of a demonstration, citing Aristotle's
remark that "the premisses from which a conclusion fol-
lows are always related as whole and part", (92al2)
But some of his own remarks are inconsistent with this.
The first premisses of a science are called "generic
premisses by Hintikka, and he characterizes them as
definitory reformulations of tautologies of the form
(1) every G is a G ... hence perhaps something like (2)
every G is a G' where G' serves to define G." Clearly,
if G' serves to define G, then the extension of G can
not be nested in the extension of G'. Further, there is
a whole class of atomic premisses within a science, one
apparently for each kind-term with which the science
deals. All such premisses Hintikka characterizes as "a
kind of definition of their subject terms". None of these
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atomic premisses can be characterized as expressing a
whole-part relationship, and they may call to mind the
first-subject premisses of the Matthews interpretation.
Clearly, there are two very different kinds of
premiss m the Hintikka account. One kind assert a
set-subset relationship, and these are immediate if
there is no set falling between the sets so related.
An entirely different sort of immediate premiss is de-
finitory in nature, and has nothing whatever to do with
the whole-part relationship. is the Hintikka account,
then, simply a version of Matthews' interpretation
which emphasizes, or perhaps over-emphasizes
,
the ex-
tensional element of explanation?
It would be hasty to conclude that it is. First of
all, Hintikka s atomic premisses are not coincident with
IV itthews ' commensurately universal premisses. rA. is B
-1
\ i i
,
on Matthews' account, will predicate an essential attri-
bute, B
i ,
of the species A
± ,
as its first subject. On
Hintikka 's account, an immediate premiss of the form
rA
i
is B? is a reformulation of a definition, so B
i
must
be the essence of A^
,
not merely an essential attribute
of it. Moreover, B^ can not be predicated of A^ at all,
since definitions never predicate. Finally, if we are
34
to take the definitional nature of Hintikka's atomic
premisses seriously, there will be only one such premiss
for each species. On Matthews' account, there will be
several such premisses for each species, one for each
essential attribute of the species.
Essenial attributes seem to be those which are nec-
essarily connected with the essence of a species, but
which are not themselves part of that essence: since
the species has essence E, it necessarily has certain
attributes B, C, D. it is essence which plays a major
role in Hintikka's account of explanation, whereas
essential attributes carry the weight for Matthews.
Hintikka's interpretation differs quite signifi-
cantly from Matthews
' . But are these alternative in-
terpretations of the same thing? A careful considera-
tion of the case shows that they are not: Hintikka's
interpretation explicates one sort of syllogism and
explanation, while Matthews' interpretation explicates
an entirely distinct sort of explanatory syllogism.
Hintikka, emphasizing the Prior Analytics, is con-
cerned with the explanation of A's being C's, where 'A'
and 'C' are kind-terms. His account of such explana-
tions seems to be this: we show that A's are B-^'s by
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showing that the
in the essence of
showing that the
in the essence of
showing that the
essence of B
x
is contained or included
A; we show that E^'s are B^s by
essence of B
2
is contained or included
... we show that B^
' s are C's by
essence of C is contained or included
in the essence of B .
n
Matthews is doing something quite different. Em-
phasizing the Posterior Analytics
, he is concerned with
explanations of why A's are C, where 'A 1 is a kind-term
and ' C' is a predicate. His commens urate ly universal
premisses therefore cannot be expressions of essence,
since, if they were, his demonstrations would be demon-
strations of essence, which are not possible in Aristo-
tle's view. Moreover, a circularity of explanation
would result if the commensurately universal premisses
were expressions of essence. Suppose we have 'A's are
C because A's are B's', where 'A' and 'B' are kind-terms
and 'C' expresses the essence of B's. We have then as-
serted that A's are C because they are B's, but how do
we establish that A's are B's? We cannot appeal to the
essences of A's and B's without making our explanation
circular. Thus the first-subject explanations will not
do as accounts of essence.
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It can also be seen that first-subject explanations
presuppose mediating explanations, in so far as they
rely on a second premiss to the effect that all A's are
B's. Matthews' explanations take the following form:
B's are C, (c has B as its first-subject and is an es-
sential attribute of B ' s ) , A's are B's; therefore, A's
are c, in virtue of being B's. Establishing the second
premiss involves proving a class-inclusion, precisely
the task with which Hintikka is concerned.
Thus, the Matthews account does differ significantly
from Hintikka' s. This difference reflects, not a change
in standards or methodology between the Prior Analytics
and the Posterior Analytics
,
but a change in purpose.
The Prior Analytics is concerned with demonstrations of
•O. 3
class-inclusion, the Posterior Analytics with demonstra-
tions of essential nature. The accounts are not incon-
sistent accounts of the same thing, but accounts of al-
together different things. The Posterior Analytics ver-
sion of explanation does not contradict the Prior Analy-
tics^ version, but presupposes and goes beyond it, under-
taking a different task of explanation.
Science is unquestionably concerned with essential
nature. Thus it is demonstrations exhibiting essential
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nature which are important to science, and scientific
explanations will involve syllogisms of the sort de-
scribed by Matthews. Hintikka's account is indeed in-
adequate as an account of scientific explanation, but
clearly it is not irrelevant to such an account. Mat-
thews is correct in asserting that Hintikka's nested
sequences do not play a role in the explanatory syllo-
gism itself, but they are necessary to establishing
the truth of the second premiss of such a syllogism.
It is the explanatory syllogism which "exhibits" es-
sential nature, and so it is explanatory syllogisms
with which science is directly concerned.
What is important in all of this for my purposes
is that Hintikka's claim, that the ontological founda-
tion of a science is the existence of the subject-genus
of that science, is not affected by Matthews' more com-
plete account of scientific syllogism. We can accept
Matthews’ account, or something like it, as a more ac-
curate interpretation of Aristotle's theory of explana-
tory syllogisms, without rejecting Hintikka's proposal
entirely. Hintikka has given an account of what is
presupposed by scientific syllogisms, but mistakenly
put forward that account as an account of the scienti-
fic syllogisms themselves. His remarks on the ontolo-
gical importance of the subject-genus are quite correct
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however, and I shall now defend them against an attack
levelled by Lynn Rose.
In his "Reply to Professor Hintikka", 6 Rose makes
much of terminological issues that have little bearing
on philosophically interesting points. As to the na-
ture of scientific demonstration, he agrees with Mat-
thews that the major and middle terms must be co-ex-
tensive, and not nested, as Hintikka suggests. But
Rose further proposes that we reject Hintikka' s ac-
count of the priority of ontological assumptions in a
science. On Hintikka' s account, what one assumes in
doing zoology, for example, is the existence of animals,
the genus with which zoology is concerned. By demon-
strating that various species fall under the genus Anim-
al, one at the same time proves the existence of those
species
.
Rose objects to this characterization. In his view,
what is assumed is the existence of the minor term, or
species, and the existence of the major term, or genus,
is proved. Thus, instead of assuming the existence of
animals and proving the existence of dogs, we assume the
existence of dogs and prove the existence of animals.
6. Rose, Lynn, "Reply to Professor Hintikka", unpublished
manuscript. Read at the Western Division Meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, 1972.
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No doubt, when viewed in isolation from all of the
extant works of Aristotle, Rose’s proposal is intuitively
more appealing than Hintikka's. if we are looking for a
methodology of investigation, we would probably do well
to prefer Rose's suggestion to Hintikka's. if we wanted
to establish the existence of sub-atomic particles, we
would be ill-advised to assume the existence of sub-atomic
particles and attempt to prove the existence of mu-ons
sy llogis tically
. Rather, one would naturally start by
looking for mu-ons, or sub-atomic particles of some other
sort, and, having found them, feel justified in affirming
the existence of sub-atomic particles.
But, since our concern is a characterization of Ari-
stotelian science and explanation, presumably we do not
want to ignore what Aristotle said. In the Posterior
Analytics enumeration of the elements of a science,
quoted on page 24, Aristotle states quite clearly that
it is the subject genus which is posited and that, though
their meaning is assumed, the existence of the attributes
is not. Moreover, the genus is prior to the species,
since "Some things are called prior and posterior in this
sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e.
those which can be without other things, while other
things can not be without them...", (Metaphysics N,
1091al7). A genus can exist independently of any one of
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its species, but no species can exist without its genus.
Finally, the genus is more fundamental than the species:
"... but if we know each thing by its definition, and
the genera are the principles or starting points of
definitions, the genera must also be the principles of
definable things. And if to get knowledge of the spe-
cies according to which things are named is to get know-
ledge of the things, the genera are at least the start-
ing points of the species/'
(Metaphysics B, 998bl5).
We cannot have knowledge of dogs sufficient to prove
the existence of animals without having knowledge of the
genus itself.
Rose's proposal does seem to be supported by the
Physics
, which opens
:
When the objects of an inquiry, in any
department, have principles, conditions, or
elements, it is through acquaintance with
these that knowledge, that is to say scien-
tific knowledge, is attained. For we do not
think that we know a thing until we are ac-
quainted with its primary conditions or
first principles, and have carried our anal-
ysis as far as its simplest elements. Plain-
ly therefore in the science of Nature, as in
other branches of study, our first task is
to determine what relates to its principles.
The natural way of doing this is to start
from the things which are more knowable and
obvious to us and proceed towards those which
are clearer and more knowable by nature;
for the same things are not 'knowable rela-
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tiveiy to us and 'knowable' without qual-ification. So m the present inquiry wemust follow this method and advance fromwhat is more obscure by nature, but clear-er to us
, towards what is more clear andmore knowable by nature.
(Phys.
, 184a9 ff
)
It seems plausible to suppose that what we are most
familiar with are the various species, and that we be-
come aware of superordinate species and genera only
through analysis and comparison of these species. We
are familiar with dogs and cats and men, and by analys-
ing or defining these species we become aware of com-
mon attributes which enable us to group them under more
general headings, such as mammal, vertebrate, and anim-
al. If the syllogism were the means by which we accomp-
lished this analysis and classification, then Rose's
account of the priority of ontological assumptions might
be preferable to Hintikka's.
But is the syllogism a methodological tool for sci-
ence? Do scientists employ the syllogism directly in
carrying out their investigations? We must distinguish
the actual investigation involved in science from the
setting out or presentation of the results of that in-
vestigation, just as we distinguish a lab report from
the actual experiment carried out. Is the syllogism a
tool of investigation, or a tool of presentation? Is
it both, or neither?
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Following a suggestion made by W. D. Ross, 7 Jona-
than Barnes has argued persuasively that Aristotle had
no intention of providing a scientific methodology in
Posterior Analytics
. in Barnes' opinion, Aristo-
tle's primary concern in the Posterior Analytics is
the proper method for teaching a science, not the proper
method for carrying out investigations. One must teach
a science in a way that will make clear the various
necessary connections and causes which explain the phe-
nomena which the science has investigated. And this is
precisely what the scientific syllogism does.
This is not to say that demonstration plays no nor-
mative role in science. A given proposition, discovered
by whatever method, will be admissible as a truth of the
science only if it can be placed in some syllogistic
chain appropriate to the science. This is not unlike
the procedure that has always dominated mathematics:
the truth of major theorems is often perceived by intui-
tion, but the theorem is admissible only after a proof
has been given. The syllogism plays a role in Aristo-
telian scientific investigation as a standard for evalu-
7. Ross, W. D. Aristotle
, Barnes and Noble, New York,
19 49. Page 32.
8. Barnes, Jonathan. "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstra-
tion", Phronesis
,
vol. XIV, 1969. Pages 123 - 52.
43
ating the results of investigation, not as a tool for
carrying out investigation.
If this is correct, and I think that it is, then
Rose's proposal is not nearly so attractive. in scien-
tific investigation, one proceeds from the naturally
obscure to the naturally clear, perhaps from species to
genus. But this investigatory stage of the science is
not demonstrative at all - we do not proceed from spe-
cies to genus by constructing syllogisms, but do so
through empirical investigation and the like. Demon-
stration plays a role in setting out the results of in-
vestigation. Having discovered the principles of the
science, that which was obscure to us, the task is to
demonstrate or exhibit the dependence of the phenomena
investigated, that which was clear to us but naturally
obscure, on those principles. It is of the very nature
of a principle to explain other things, while remaining
unexplained itself. Yet the Rose account reverses this
dependence : he would have us answer the question "Why
do animals exist?" with "Because dogs do". This is cer-
tainly misguided. The correct order of dependence would
involve answering the question "Why do dogs exist?" with
"Because they are animals, and animals exist". This sort
of dependence is accurately reflected by Hintikka in as-
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suming the existence of the genus
istence of the species.
and proving the ex-
One final point ought to be made. Rose suggests
that Hintikka's interpretation commits Aristotle to the
existence of unicorns, whereas his own account does not
He asks us to consider the following arguments:
R: (1) Dogs exist
_(2) Dogs are animals
(3) Animals exist
H: (4) Animals exist
(5) Dogs are animals
(6) Dogs exist
R is evidently valid and, since its premisses are true,
it proves the existence of animals. H apparently pre-
sents problems for Rose, though he does not say pre-
cisely what those problems are. Instead, he asks us to
consider H'
:
3
H : (4
'
)
Animals exist
_(5
1
) Unicorn s are animals
(6') Unicorns exist
If Hmtikka accepts H as a proof of the existence of dogs.
Rose argues, he must also accept H ' as a proof of the
existence of unicorns.
Hintikka does want the existence of species to fol-
low from the existence of their genus, and so presumably
he does want to accept something like H as a proof of the
existence of a species. But if H is to be a syllogism
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111 thS firSt figure
' a scientific syllogism, then (4)
must be universally quantified: it must be understood
as "All animals exist". if H ' is to be of the same
form as H, (4') must also be understood as "All animals
exist". m that case, Hintikka can block H ' simply by
pointing out that either (4’) or (S') is false, since
rejecting (4') would undermine H as well as H'
, it is
safe to assume that Hintikka would reject (5').
But what, in an Aristotelian context, could be
more natural than rejecting (5')? For Aristotle, being
and being something or other are intimately connected.
Unicorns do not fall under the genus Animal because if
they did, the essence of animality would be included
m the essence of unicorns. But unicorns have no es-
sence at all, because they do not exist. So (5') may
b« rejected.
What I hope to have established is what I shall
call the ontological primacy of the subject-genus of a
science. It is the view that what is ontologically es-
sential to a science is the genus with which the science
deals. Any justification of the ontological foundations
of a science requires an account of the existence of the
genus whose essential attributes that science investi-
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gates. The over-riding importance of the existence of
the genus of a science derives from two considerations:
first
,
it is knowledge of the essential nature if the
genus which is the end of the science, and we cannot
know the essential nature of what does not exist;
second, the existence of the species whose essential
natures the science also investigates is guaranteed by
the existence of the genus under which they fall.
Though other important questions will certainly
arise, my central concern in the following chapters will
be to answer the two questions: "With what genus is
each of the mathematical sciences concerned?" and "What
account, consistent with Aristotle's metaphysical views,
can be given of the existence of those genera?" I
should emphasize that this task is in the realm of meta-
mathematics: each science assumes the existence of its
subject genus, and no science is required to offer an
account of, or prove, that existence.
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CHAPTER III
THE GENUS OF ARITHMETIC
I have argued, in chapter two, that the primary on-
tological presupposition of a science is that the genus
whose essential attributes that science investigates
exists, and that, if one is concerned to justify or legit
imize a science in terms of its ontological foundations,
it is the existence of the genus for which an account
must be given. This account lies outside of the science
itself, since the existence of the genus is assumed by
the science. The existence of the species falling under
the genus, on the other hand, is demonstrated within the
science. What, then, is the genus with which Arithmetic
is concerned?
Several passages in the Posterior Analytics suggest
that Unity is the genus whose existence Arithmetic as-
sumes :
Also peculiar to the science are the subjects
the existence as well as the meaning of which
it assumes, and the essential attributes of
which it investigates, for example, in arith-
metic, units, in geometry points and lines.
( Post . An. , 76b4 - 7)
Hence it is evident that there are essential
natures which are immediate, that is, are
basic premisses; and of these not only that
they are but also what they are must be as-
sumed or revealed in some other way [other
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than by demonstration]. This too is the ac-tual procedure of the arithmetician, who as-sumes both the nature and existence of unit.
(Post.
_An
. ,
9 3b21 - 25)
Previously, 8 we saw that the genus was the "start-
ing point" for knowledge of the species, and in the Meta
physics we find:
Measure is that by which quantity is known, andquantity qua quantity is known by unity or by
number, and all number is known by unity.
Therefore all quantity qua quantity is known by
unity; and that by which quantities are pri-
marily known is absolute unity. Thus unity isthe starting point of number qua number.
(Met . I7 1052b20 - 24)
If Unity is the genus of Arithmetic, giving an ac-
count of the existence of that genus seems to offer no
difficulties. All substances are unities. The genus
Unity exists, because substances exist, and all substance
unities
. Thus, there is no problem in providing an
ontological foundation for Arithmetic, if Unity is its
genus
.
There are a number of considerations, however, which
preclude taking Unity as the genus of Arithmetic. First
of all, in Metaphysics G, we are told that the discovery
of the essential attributes of Being qua Being and of
Unity qua Unity belong to First Philosophy, that is, to
8 . See chapter II, page 40.
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Metaphysics. if unity were the genus of Arithmetic,
Arithmetic would be First Philosophy, or some branch of
it. Yet First Philosophy is contrasted with the particu
lar sciences, and among them the mathematical sciences,
in Metaphysics G . 9
Further and more serious difficulties arise from the
very close connection between Unity and Being emphasized
in Metaphysics G and I. In Metaphysics A, Aristotle ar-
gues that there can be no unified science of Being because
'being' is homonymous: 'is' has different senses in the
different categories. In Metaphysics I, Aristotle con-
nects 'being' with 'unity'
:
That in a sense unity means the same as beingis clear from the facts that its meanings
correspond to the categories one to one, andit is not comprised within any category (e.g.it is comprised neither in 'what a thing is'
nor in quality, but is related to them just
as being is) ; that in 'one man' nothing moreis predicated than in 'man' (just as being is
nothing apart from substance or quality or
quantity); and that to be one is just to be
a particular thing.
(Met . I, 1054al3 - IS)
If no unified science of Being is possible because of
homonymy, and if 'unity', like 'being', has different uses
in the different categories, then it would seem that Arith-
9. Met. G, 100 3a20 - b30.
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metic is not possible as a unified science
is Unity.
if its genus
In "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of
Aristotle", 10 G. E. L. Owen maintains that, in Metaphys-
ics G, Aristotle is retreating from his claim that 'is'
is homonymous. A unified science of Being, Metaphysics
or First Philosophy, is possible, Owen argues, because
'is' is not strictly homonymous. There are a number of
senses of 'is', but there is one primary sense which is
incorporated into the other senses. That is, all of the
definitions of the various senses of 'is' make reference
to the primary sense of 'is'. This dependency of senses
on one primary sense Owen calls "focal analysis".
Metaphysics I suggests that there is a primary sense
of
' one
'
,
or 'unity', which functions for unity in much
the way that the primary sense of 'is' functions for being.
That is, all of the various senses of 'one' or 'unity'
depend in some way upon the primary sense of the term in
question. If Owen is right, and Aristotle's distinction
between primary and secondary senses of 'is' provides us
with a unified science of Being, perhaps the same distinc-
tion will, when applied to 'unity', provide us with a uni-
fied science of Arithmetic.
10. Owen, G. E. L. "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier
Works of Aristotle". Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-
Fourth Century
,
section VII.
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But there is a problem with Owen's proposal. In
Me taphysics A, Aristotle argues that, if there is to be
a single science of Being, 'is' must be univocal in all
of its uses. But 'is' is not univocal, it is homonymous,
and so no science of Being is possible. Owen's focal
analysis may indeed enable Aristotle to circumvent this
argument against the possibility of a unified science of
Being, but there is another objection to such a science
which focal analysis does nothing to mitigate.
In the Posterior Analytics
, Aristotle includes as
one of the three elements of a science a subject genus
whose essential attributes the science investigates:
A single science is one whose domain is a
genus, viz. all the subjects consti-
tuted out of the primary entities of the
genus - i.e. the parts of this total sub-ject - and their essential properties. 11
(Post . An
. ,
87a38 - 39)
This characterization is carried over into the Metaphysics
Therefore to investigate the essential attri-
butes of one class of things
, starting from
one set of beliefs, is the business of one
science
.
(Met . B, 997a23 - 4)
Yet in the Metaphysics
,
Aristotle repeatedly asserts that
neither Being nor Unity is a genus. 12 Being and Unity
11. See also Post . An., 76bl2.
12 • Met
. ,
998b21, 1040al6
,
1053bl2.
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thus seem to be precluded as genera for any single sci-
ence, whether or not the problem of homonymy can be sur-
mounted by appeal to focal analysis.
It should be pointed out that focal analysis does
not itself mitigate the claim that Being and Unity are
not genera. Even if one could argue that focal analysis
might enable us to include Being and Unity as genera, it
is quite clear that Aristotle did not think that the de-
pendence of secondary senses on primary could be used in
this way. For, in Metaphysics I, in close proximity
with his discussion of the senses of 'unity', Aristotle
reiterates his claim that neither Being nor Unity is a
genus
:
Therefore, on the one hand, genera are not
certain entities and substances separable
from other things ; and on the other hand
the one cannot be a genus, for the same
reasons for which being and substance cannot
be genera.
(Met . I, 105 3b20 - 23)
Thus, whatever advantages accrue from the intro-
duction of focal analysis, it is clear that focal analysis
does not entitle us to construe Being as a single genus.
Since Being is not a genus, the investigation of Being qua
Being lacks one of the three elements which, in the Post-
eriory Analytics
,
go to make up any science. At best,
First Philosophy is a pseudo-science, a study which bears
a strong resemblance to science but is not, strictly
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speaking, a science. And the same will hold true for
Arithmetic, if it is the study of Unity.
It seems that we are left with the following di-
lemma: either we accept the Posterior Analytics account
of science and construe First Philosophy as some sort of
deficient analogue to science, or we accept the claim of
—
aphySiCS G
' that First Philosophy is a unified science,
and abandon the Posterior Analytics account of science.
The same dilemma presents itself for Arithmetic, if „e
take it to be the study of Unity.
Whatever we may decide in the case of First Phil-
osophy, i think it is ill-advised to allow this dilemma
to arise at all in the case of Arithmetic. First, as
noted earlier, whichever horn of the dilemma we adopt, Arith-
metic, when construed as the study of Unity, becomes ei-
ther identical with First Philosophy, (if we read "unity
is the same as being" as strongly as possible), or a sub-
ordinate branch of First Philosophy, and this conflicts
with the contrast drawn between First Philosophy and the
mathematical sciences in Metaphysics G. in fact, G im-
plicitly excludes the study of number from First Philoso-
phy:
13. -l t seems to me that the first alternative is prefer-
able, but a lengthy consideration of this point is not
germane to the present work.
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us since these are the essential modifi-cations of Unity qua Unity and of Being2U| Being
f
and not qua numbers or lines orrire
'
it is clear that it belongs to this
botWh [Flrst Phi l° sophy ] to investigateoth the essence of these concepts andtheir properties.
(Met. G, 1004b5 - 7)
Second, Aristotle takes Arithmetic to be a paradigm of
his Posterior Analytics account of science, and it is
difficult to believe that, in a single work, Aristotle
would set out the elements of a demonstrative science
and offer as an example of such a science a study which
lacked one of those elements.
We can avoid the dilemma entirely in the case of
Arithmetic simply by finding an alternative to Unity as
the genus xor Arithmetic. One candidate which immedi-
ately presents itself is Plurality: numbers might be con
strued as species of Plurality.
One serious objection to taking Unity as the gen-
us of Arithmetic may not apply to Plurality. Unity is
not a genus, as Aristotle consistently maintains, and so
it can not function as a subject genus for any Aristoteli-
an science. At least part of Aristotle's motivation for
denying that Unity is a genus appears to be that 'unity'
is predicable of anything and everything which exists.
Obviously, anything which is, is_, and similarly, anything
which is is a something or other, a unity of some sort or
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other. So neither Being nor Unity is a genus, (of.
1054al0 ff). i take it that the idea here is something
like this: to say that a thing is a member of a genus
is to classify that thing as a thing of a certain kind.
To classify a thing as a thing of a certain kind is to
distinguish it from things not of that kind, since
'being' and 'unity' are predicable, in some way or other,
of anything whatever, saying that something has being,
or that it is a unity, is not to classify it at all, be-
cause such claims do not distinguish the thing in ques-
tion from anything else. Thus, there seems to be the
presupposition that a necessary condition for a predicate
F, to pick out or name a genus, is that there should be
something, x, such that
' x is F' is not true.
Now one might be tempted to argue as follows:
plurality is the privation of unity. Since 'unity' is
predicable of everything, 'plurality' is predicable of
nothing. But a genus exists only in so far as individuals
of that genus exist, so plurality, as a genus, does not
exist. Hence, plurality can not be the subject genus of
Arithmetic
.
Such an argument against taking Plurality as the
subject genus of Arithmetic fails. Both 'unity' and
plurality have many senses - presumably their senses
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correspond one to one. Now something which is in one
sense a unity may, in another sense, be a plurality, a
man, for example, gua man, is a unity, because he is an
individual of his species. But a man qua extended is a
Plurality, because he is infinitely divisible. Now I
think that Aristotle's position is that, for anything
whatever, some sense of 'unity' is predicable of it. sim-
ilarly, for most things, there is some sense of 'plurality'
predicable of them. But there are things, geometric points
for example, which are in no sense pluralities. Thus, it
is not the case that nothing is a plurality, nor is it the
case that everything is a plurality. It seems to be open
to Aristotle, then, to allow that Plurality is legiti-
mately a genus, and in distinguishing Plurality and Mag-
nitude as kinds falling under the category of Quantity,
he seems to be doing precisely this, (cf. Me^. D
, 1020a5f)
.
But other problems do arise if we take Plurality to
be the genus of Arithmetic. Plurality is said to be the
"opposite" of Unity, or the privation of Unity, and, as
such, it is included in the subject matter of First Philo-
sophy :
Now since it is the work of one science to
investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed
to unity - and it belongs to one science to in-
vestigate the negation and the privation be-
cause in both cases we are really investigating
the one thing of which the negation or the pri-
vation is a negation or privation... [the study
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(Met. G, 1004a9 - 19 )
Thus, the problems which arose as a result of subsuming
Arithmetic under First Philosophy arise again if Plurali-
ty is taken as the genus of Arithmetic.
Another problem which arises for an interpretation
taking Plurality as the genus of Arithmetic stems from
the fact that not every plurality is a number. We shall
see later that a plurality must satisfy certain condi-
tions in order to be measurable, and only those plurali-
ties which are measured will count as numbers. But Arith-
metic seems to be concerned exclusively with numbers,
their properties and relations with one another. If this
is so, the", if Plurality were the genus of Arithmetic,
Arithmetic would be seriously deficient as a science, for
it would investigate only a part of its subject genus.
Plurality in general, then, will not do as the genus for
Arithmetic
.
At one point in the Posterior Analytics
, Aristotle
explicitly mentions a subject-genus for Arithmetic:
For fundamental truths are of two kinds, those
which are premisses of demonstration and the
subject genus; and though the former are com-
14. See also Met. I, 1054a20.
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m°n, the latter
magnitude - are
number, for instance, andpeculiar.
(Post. An.
, 88bl8 ff
)
In the passages previously considered,15 Unity was sug-
gested as the subject genus of Arithmetic. The sugges-
tion arises because one of the elements of a science is
the subject genus, the meaning and existence of which is
assumed. The passages cited marked units as that whose
existence Arithmetic assumes, and it was quite natural
to infer that Unity is the subject genus of Arithmetic.
Now we have the statement that Number is the subject
genus of Arithmetic, and Number, whatever it may be, can
not be identified with Unity. 16 How do we reconcile
these apparently opposed strains of the Posterior Analy-
tics?
Aristotle characterizes number variously as "a plur
a-Lty of units" (1053a23)
,
"a measured plurality and a
plurality of measures" (1088a5), and "of more units than
one, and specifically of "so many"" (207bl2)
. This sug-
gests that, taking Number as the subject-genus of Arith-
15. See chapterlll, pages 47 - 48.
16. At 207bl2
,
for example, a contrast is drawn between
unit and number by pointing out that the unit is a-
tomic, while number is non-atomic.
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metic
,
the ’fundamental truth" or first premiss of
that science will be something to the effect that "Num-
ber is a plurality of units". Both the existence and
meaning of Number will be assumed by Arithmetic. Clear-
ly / if Number is assumed to exist, and if the essence,
or an essential attribute, of Number is that it is a
plurality of units, then units are also assumed to ex-
ist. There cannot be a plurality of units if there are
no units. We need not infer from this that Unity, not
Number, is the genus of Arithmetic any more than we need
infer from the fact that all animals are physical ob-
jects that Physical Object, not Animal, is the genus of
Zoology. I think that the passages cited on the first
page of this chapter can be understood in this light,
and that, so understood, they present no difficulty for
the view that Number is the subject-genus of Arithmetic.
Briefly, I suggest that Number is the subject-genus
Arithmetic
,
that the species of Number are the various
natural numbers, and that the individuals of those spe-
cies are individual properties of groups or collections
of things.
I am not using the term 'property' with the narrow
technical sense that Aristotle gives it in Topics A. 5.
Rather
,
I am using it in a very broad way that is cate-
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gory-promiscuous: there are quantitative, qualitative,
relational, temporal, etc., properties. The properties
with which Arithmetic deals will fall under the cate-
gory of Quantity, and in particular, under the genus
Measured Plurality, or Number.
There is some controversy which arises in interpret-
ing Aristotle on the point of individuation of properties.
The discussion of the various interpretations is commonly
m terms of the individuation of qualities, but the points
considered seem to me to be applicable to the other cate-
gories as well. Quantity among them. in the course of my
discussion of number, I will argue that Aristotle main-
tains that there are species of number, and that the in-
dividuals of those species are the numbers of particular
groups or collections. For example, Ten is a species of
Number, two individuals of which are my ten fingers, and
my wife s ten fingers. The implications of this inter-
pretation of Aristotle on number for the dispute over the
individuation of qualities is properly a topic for another
work
.
One noteworthy critic of the view that numbers are
properties of external objects or of collections of ex-
ternal objects is Gottlob Frege. He says:
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... And it is quite true that, while I am
P°sltlon ' simply by thinking ofit differently, to alter the colour orhardness of a thing in the slightest, Iam able to think of the Iliad either as one
LTAf°
r dS 24 books
'
or as some large num-ber of verses... Nor can we say in this
case that the different numbers exist inthe same thing side by side, as different
colours do. I can point to the patch ofeach individual colour without saying a
word, but I cannot in the same way pointto the individual numbers. if i can callthe same object red and green with equal
right, it is a sure sign that the object
named is not what really has the green
colour;
.
for that we must first get a sur-face which is green only. Similarly, an
object to which I can ascribe different
numbers with equal right is not what reallyhas a number
.
17
Apparently
,
Frege is making some appeal to the law
of non-contradiction here. Red and green are usually
considered to be contraries, and so both can not be
truly predicated of a single thing at a single time.
That which is properly said to be red can not at che
rime time be green. When something is described as be-
ing both red and green, what is meant is that parts of
it are red and other parts are green. Properly speak-
er11? • only parts of thing are red, and those parts are
not green, and vice versa.
Frege argues that the same line of reasoning ap-
plies to numerical properties: a collection which is
17. Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic, §22.
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six can not be seven. For the argument to go through,
we must suppose that numerical properties are contraries
of one another; that, for example, six is a contrary of
seven. Let us grant this point.
Now consider a heap of one hundred grey stones.
One cannot, simply by thinking about the heap in a dif-
ferent way, alter the color of the heap. The heap is
grey, and no amount of cogitation will change it to
green. On the other hand, when I think of the heap as
a heap of stones, it is a heap of one hundred, whereas
when I think of it as a heap of molecules, it is a heap
of trillions. The very same heap seems to have the
quite distinct numerical properties one hundred and
trillions
. This shows, according to Frege, that the
heap cannot properly be said to have either property,
for we can no more say that a single thing has distinct
numerical properties than we can say that a single thing
has two different colors.
From Aristotle's point of view, the mistake in
Frege s reasoning lies in his supposition that the only
distinction between the collection of stones and the
collection of molecules is the way in which an observer
chooses to regard the heap. The collection of stones is
one thing, and it has the property one hundred. The col-
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lection of molecules is quite another thing, and it has
the property trillions. It is indeed true that the col-
lection of stones also has the property being made up of
--
llllQns
— -?.lecules , but this is not a number; and
the collection of molecules has the property making up_
one hundred stones
,
but this is not a number either.
And it is not true either that the collection of stones
has the property trillions
,
or that the collection of
molecules has the property one hundred.
/ it might be urged, the heap of stones is the
very same heap as the heap of molecules - there is only
one heap there. Thus, if the heap of stones has the
prope-ty one hundred
,
the heap of molecules has that
property as well.
In both the Physics
,
(202bl0 ff )
,
and the Metaphys -
i££, (1017bl5 ff ) , Aristotle distinguishes between rela-
tions of sameness which are apparently of differing
strengths. Things are the same properly speaking, or
in the strongest sense, when their substance )
is one. This strict sense of sameness, irt'ov^ H-aP
1 '
<*cVLO)
,
appears to be, at least roughly, our ordinary no-
tion of identity. But there is a weaker sense, ( /£*c\rtov/
aJs
/#/3&/ar)Xo5 ) , in which things may be said to be
the same though their substance or being (Vo ) is
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not one. 'WtiV X*V2 K/r ' may be translated
as "accidental sameness".
Anthony Willing proposes that the condition, that x
and y are strictly or properly the same only if their sub-
stance is one, may be understood as 'x = y only if to be
x is the same as to be y
1 rx is accidentally the same
as y
1 is true just in case rx is y-1 is true, but 'to be
x is the same as to be y1 is not true. Willing argues
that an inference from rx is y1 and rFx to rFy1 is valid
only if rx is y
1
means rx = y
1
.
Now the collection of molecules is accidentally the
same as the collection of stones, but not identical with
it, because to be the collection of molecules in question
is not the same as to be the collection of stones. The
molecules as a matter of fact make up the stones, but
i ley need not have. The very same collection of mole-
l
cules might have made up a single boulder, or they might
have made up nothing else at all.
If Willing is correct, then, we can not infer from
the fact that the heap of molecules is the heap of stones
and the heap of molecules is trillions, that the heap of
18. Willing, Anthony. Aristotle on the Paradoxes of
Accidence
,
particularly pages 101 - 104
.
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stones is trillions, because the heap of molecules and
the heap of stones are not identical.
Aristotle's answer to Frege, then, is that the heap,
m so far as it is a heap of stones, is one hundred, and
in so far as it is a heap of molecules, is trillions, but
that the heap qua heap of stones is not identical with
the heap qua heap of molecules. The collection of stones
is one hundred, the collection of molecules is trillions.
Nor, as Frege seems to suggest, does it follow from the
fact that the answer we get in counting the things in
the heap depends upon what we take it to be a heap of,
that the numbers are not really properties of the col-
lections. The stones are there whether anyone ever takes
them to be stones or not, and similarly for the mole-
cules; and there are one hundred stones there and tril-
lions of molecules, whether anyone ever counts them or
not.
So far I have presented an interpretation of Ari-
stotle which takes numbers to be properties of collections,
and considered an objection to such a view raised by
Frege. I want now to consider a problem that arises when
we consider the individuation of collections, which, on
the interpretation of Aristotle being presented, will also
be the individuation of particular numbers.
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We have supposed that an individual number is a
quantitative property of a particular collection of
things of some sort. The collection will be the col-
lection it is, and hence have the particular numerical
property it has, in virtue of the particular things in
the collection. Starting with a particular collection
of ton stones
,
if I remove one of the stones and replace
ft with another, X have a different collection of stones,
hence a different individual ten.
Now let us consider some particular collection of
four stones. Surely we want to say that there are two
two's in that four: this would seem to mean that there
are two sub-collections of that four-collection each of
which hag, a property of being two. But, if we consider
the case, we seem to find that there are not merely two
two's in that four, but six distinct particular two's.
Let the stones be a, b, c, and d. Then the collections
(a,b)
,
(b,c)
,
(c,d)
,
etc., each are two.
Modern Nominalists deal with this sort of problem
by employing a notion of "overlapping". 19 An individual,
a, is said to overlap an individual, b, provided a and b
19. See Rolph A. Eberle's Nominalistic Systems , particu-
larly pages 44 - 50.
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have some part in common. If the number four is identi-
fied with the collection <a,b,c,d) itself, then that
collection can properly be said to have (a,b) and (c,d)
as parts, or (a,c) and (b,d) as parts, but it cannot
properly be said to have (a,b) and (b,c) as parts, be-
cause these individuals overlap. A complex, or non-
atomic, individual, c, is properly said to have a and b
as parts only if a and b do not overlap. The claim
that there are two two's in four in this case amounts
to the claim that there are two parts of any particular
four each of which itself has two parts. It is incorrect
to say that there are six two's in four, because there
are not six non-overlapping parts of four each of which
has two parts.
But what is Aristotle's solution to this difficulty?
He nowhere explicitly considers the problem, though he
discusses a similar objection to a certain form of Pla-
tonism in Metaphysics M. A solution is suggested, however,
in Metaphysics Z, where Aristotle says:
A Substance cannot consist of substances
present in it in complete reality; for
things that are thus in complete reality
two are never in complete reality one,
though if they are potentially two, they
can be one... It is clear therefore that
the same will hold good of number, if
number is a synthesis of units, as is
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said by some;
or there is no
plete reality.
for two is either not one,
unit present in it in com-
Z, 10 39a3 ff)
What Aristotle would say about the competing claims,
"there are two two's in four” and "there are six two's
m four", is that both are false, if what is meant is
that there are two or six actual two's in four, re-
spectively. There are no actual sub-collections of the
particular four-collection we are considering which
have the property of being two, because what is actually
many, (actually made up of sub-collections), can not be
actually one, (actually a single collection with a nu-
merical property). If four is to exist at all, it
must be a four, the property of a single unified col-
lection. But if there are actually sub-collections of
that collection, then that collection will lack unity,
and have no properties at all. Thus, if the claims in
question are to be consistent with the existence of
four, they must be understood as claims about potential-
ity* there are potentially two two's in four, or there
are potentially six two's in four.
To say that there are m n's in j is just to say
that a collection which has the property j can be di-
vided, (though it is not actually divided)
,
into m col-
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lections each of which has the property of being an n.
To say that there are two two's in four is to say that
one can perform a division on a given four-collection
and produce two actual sub-collections each of which
is two
, and this is true. To say that there are six
two's in four, on the other hand, is to say that one
can divide a given four-collection and produce six sub-
collections each of which has the property of being
two. This is not true. For suppose two of the actual
sub-collections produced by the division are (a,b) and
(b,c): there are two one's in each of these two-collec-
tions
, but again, the one's are present only potentially.
How can these two two's be produced by a division of the
original four-collection? I start with (a,b,c,d), which
has the property of being four. I segregate one two-
collection, (a,b)
. But now b is no longer available to
be included in another two. I can't separate the b from
(a,b), because it is not present as an actual one to be
segregated. It is present as an individual in (a,b)
only potentially, and if I pull it out of (a,b) in or-
der to include it in (b,c)
,
I destroy the original two,
(a,b)
.
The illusion that one can produce six actual two's
from a particular four-collection arises because it is
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obvious that, given any four discreet elements, I can
associate them by two's in six different ways. But
this is not at all what is happening when I divide an
actual four-collection into sub-collections each of
which is two, because I am not starting with four ac-
tual individuals and combining them in various ways,
but rather starting with one thing, a four-collection,
and dividing it one way or another. The fact is that,
given a particular collection which is four, there are
three different ways in which it can be divided into
collections which are two's, but each way produces only
two two's. Moreover, the three ways that this can be
done are mutually exclusive — only one of the three can
be actualized at a time. In order to be able to pro-
duce six two's by dividing four, (hence, in order to
make it true that there are six two's in four), one would
have to be able to actualize all three of the possible
ways of dividing the four-collection simultaneously,
but this can not be done.
Thus, Aristotle can agree to the truth of the claim
that there are two two's in four, and deny that there are
six two's in four, given a correct understanding of those
claims in terms of what is potentially present in a four-
collection .
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The intimate connection between a number and the
kind of thing numbered is emphasized in Metaphysics I f
(particularly, 1052bl4 - 1053a30)
. This intimacy pro-
duces some interesting consequences for Arithmetic.
It has already been noted that not any collection is
numbered, for number is not simply plurality, but meas-
ured plurality. The qualification "measured" excludes
those pluralities - collections - which are such that
the individuals making up the plurality do not all fall
under some single genus. A plurality is a measured
plurality only if there is a measure which measures it;
that is, a single principle of individuation which can
be applied to everything in the plurality.
Some examples may be helpful. Consider a collection
of horses and cows: this collection is no number of
horses and no number of cows, because the principle of
individuation for horses will not apply to everything in
the collection. When we have picked out all of the in-
dividual horses in the collection, we will have things
left over which are in the collection but which have not
yet been picked out or individuated - counted. The
measure, "a horse", does not succeed in measuring the
plurality in question. Obviously, the same applies to
the measure "a cow". Nonetheless, the collection is
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numbered, though it is not a number of horses or a num-
ber of cows or, for that matter, a number of horses and
cows. It is a number of animals, a number of vertebrates
a number of mammals. Each of these measures, "an animal"
"a vertebrate", "a mammal", does provide a principle of
individuation which, when applied to the members of the
collection, exhausts the collection. Each of these
measures succeeds in measuring the plurality in question.
But consider now a collection of goats and colors.
This collection will be neither a number of goats nor a
number of colors. In fact, this collection will not be
numbered at all, because the individuals in the collec-
tion fall into different categories. There will be no
genus into which all of the individuals in the collec-
tion fall, hence there will be no measure which measures
the plurality in question. Implicit in this, of course,
is the assumption that we cannot manufacture kind-terms
to serve as measures 19 For example, we cannot measure
the collection of colors and goats with the measure "a
goat or a color". Presumably, this is because "a goat
or a color" does not pick out any single natural kind,
a species or a genus
.
19 . See note, page 78.
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The view that not every plurality is numbered com-
mits Aristotle to placing restrictions on certain gener
al statements in Arithmetic. The claim that two plus
three equals five cannot be taken to be completely gen-
eral: it cannot mean, "given any individual two-collec-
tion and any individual three-collection, if the two
are combined or united, the result is an individual
five-collection'.' The reason for this should be obvious
from the foregoing discussion. If the three in question
is a property of a collection of goats, and the two in
question is a property of a collection of colors, the
collection produced by combining or uniting the two will
not be numbered at all, because it will not be a meas-
ured plurality.
In general Arithmetical claims, then, it seems that
number terms are elliptical. The statement '2+3=5'
is to be understood as '2f's + 3f's = 5f's'. Only those
numbers which are properties of collections having a
common measure can be added. Multiplication can be un-
derstood as simply repeated addition. That is, we need
not interpret '3x2=6' as '3f's x 2f's = 6f's', but
rather as '2f's + 2f's + 2f's = 6f's'. The '3' in the
original expression is elliptical, but not elliptical
for ' 3f ' s '
.
Rather, it is elliptical for ' 3 ( 2 f ' s
)
'
,
that is, it is a number of numbers, telling us how many
2f s are to be added together.
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We can now go some way toward understanding the
doctrine of Metaphysics I that number terms have many
uses, that they are said in many ways. 'Two' is ellip-
tical for 'two horses' when used to refer to or describe
a certain collection, and elliptical for 'two cows' when
used to refer to or describe a different collection. in
the one case, 'two' is being used as short-hand for 'two
horses', in the other, as short-hand for 'two cows'.
Thus, 'two' has as many uses as there are species and
genera which provide measures for pluralities.
This is not to say-, however, that number terms have
many senses, that there are distinct defining formulae
for a number corresponding to each of its many uses. In
Metaphysics I, Aristotle lists general classes of things
which are one by their own nature, distinguishing a num-
ber of principal ways in which 'one' is said, ('Co 4V ot\
yt/eV
) . These classes are: (1) the con-
tinuous, (2) that which is a whole and has a certain
shape or form; (3) in number, the individual; (4) in
kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is
indivisible. Ross distinguishes four different primary
senses of 'one' corresponding to the application of 'one'
to members of each of these four classes. 20 This sug-
20 . Ross , W. D.
,
Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. II, pages
~m' - 4.
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gests that 'one' is homonymous - that the definition or
logos of 'one' will be different when 'one' modifies
terms naming things from different classes. But this
seems to me to be incorrect.
The first class of things which are one by their
own nature is the class of continuous things. To say
that 'one' has a primary use corresponding to that
class seems to claim little more than that, in a large
number of cases where we use the term 'one', it is being
used to modify a term naming some continuous thing. On
the other hand, to say that 'one' has a sense correspond-
ing or appropriate to the class of continuous things
suggests that there is a definition of 'one' or 'x is
one', which includes reference to continuity or to con-
tinuous things. For example: 'x is one' = 'x is an
individual continuous thing'; or, 'x is one' = 'x isdf
naturally continuous
'
.
Bnt this raises a serious difficulty. For the con-
tinuous is often characterized by Aristotle as that which
is infinitely divisible, (see Physics
,
185bl0, for example).
If we are to follow Ross and accept as a sense of 'one',
the naturally continuous", then one of the senses of
'one' appears to be 'by nature infinitely divisible'.
21. Ibid, page 280.
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This is totally unacceptable, because Aristotle em-
phasizes indivisibility as the salient feature of that
which is one: at Physics 207b5, "The reason is that
what is one (To £V ) is indivisible whatever it may be,
e.g. a man is one man, not many"; at Metaphysics D,
(1016bl8 ff), "The essence of what is one is to be some
kind of beginning of number... But everywhere the one
is indivisible either in kind or in quantity". 22 if,
as the Physics suggests, what is one, in so far as it
is one, is atomic, and if, as Metaphysics D suggests,
indivisibility is part of the essence of being one, it
is extremely implausible to suppose that Aristotle
would allow a definition of 'one' which entails infi-
nite divisibility.
But the simple fact is that we don't have Aristotle
offering four senses or definitions of 'one' in Meta-
phy sics I. At the conclusion of his discussion of the
four primary uses of 'one', the four general classes of
things which are by their nature unities, Aristotle says
. . . all these are one because in some cases the move-
ment, in others the thought or the definition is indi-
visible'.', (1052a32). It seems that here Aristotle is
pointing to one feature, indivisibility, which justifies
the application of the term 'one' to the things in the
22. See also Met . I, 1053b24; Met. N, 1090al.
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different classes. The difference of use arises because
the things in one class exhibit indivisibility in vir-
tue of some aspect of their nature, (e.g., continuous
things have indivisible motion)
, while things in another
class exhibit indivisibility in virtue of some other as-
pect, (e.g., the individuals of a species can not be di-
vided into parts which are individuals of that species).
This view is supported by the remainder of 1.1.
Having distinguished the four primary classes of things
which are one, the classes of referents of the term 'one',
Aristotle asserts that giving the meaning of the term
one is a different project, and immediately undertakes
it. He says:
But it must be observed that the questions,
what sort of things are said to be one, and
what it is to be one and what is the defini-
tion of it, should not be assumed to be the
same ... For thi s reason
,
too
,
1 to be one
'
. means to be indivisible, being essentially
a this and capable of being isolated eitherin place, or in form, or in thought'; or
perhaps 'to be whole and indivisible'; but
it means especially 'to be the first measure
of a kind', and most strictly of quantity...
(Met . I, lo52bl - 19)
I think it is clear that the alternatives suggested here
are not alternative definitions or senses of 'one', but
alternative characterizations of the single sense or lo-
gos of ' one '
.
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As I have already suggested, the distinctions of
uses are not confined to the four classes of things dis-
cussed at the outset of Metaphysics I. There are as
many uses for number-terms as there are species and
genera available as substituends for 'f' in expressions
like rnf ' s* f where 'n' is a number term. Aristotle says
that in 'one man' no more is predicated than in 'man',
(1054al5 ) . To call Socrates a man is to say of Socrates
that he has a certain form, and the fact that he has
that form entails his oneness. Socrates is one in vir-
tue of having the indivisible form man
. Now what it is
to be a man is quite different from what it is to be a
horse. The principle of unity for a horse, its form, is
quite different from the principle of unity for a man.
To call Socrates one is to refer to the indivisibility
of his form, which is man; to call Secretariat one is
t > refer to the indivisibility of his form, which is
i
horse
. Thus, 'one' is being used to refer to quite dif-
ferent things: the indivisibility of man
,
on the one
hand, the indivisibility of horse on the other. 23 But
we need not, and should not, suppose that there is a
change of sense corresponding to the change of referent.
23. This may explain why 'goat or color' cannot be a
measure - there is no such form, and therefore no
principle of unity corresponding to it. Indeed,
the disjunction seems to carry with it the notion
of divisibility. (See page 72 )
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To say that a collection is numbered is to say that
it is so-many ones. The requirement that the collection
have a measure is simply the requirement that 'one' have
a single use in its application to every member of the
collection. Similarly, the requirement that only num-
bers which are properties of collections with a common
measure can be added is simply the requirement that 'one*
have a single use throughout expressions like 'so-many
ones plus so-many ones equals so-many ones'. Thus, the
multiplicity of uses of number terms is a consequence of
the multiplicity of uses of 'one'.
I have now given a rather lengthy exposition of my
interpretation of Aristotle's account of number, and
dealt with several problems to which it gives rise. One
might reasonably ask, at this point, what textual evi-
dence is there to support the claim that Aristotle held
anything like this view of number.
The case rests almost exclusively on Aristotle's
repeated references to the essences of numbers. In Meta-
physics D, we find:
' Quality 'means (1) the differentiae of the
essence of a thing, (2) that which is pre-
sent, besides quantity, in the essence of
unchangeable (mathematical) objects, e.g.
80
And,
the 'planeness
'
numbers
. .
.
or 'solidity' of composite
24
(Met. D, 1020a32 ff)
in the Posterior Analytics
:
attributes are... (2) such that,while they belong to certain subjects, thesubjects to which they belong are contained
attnbute s own defining formula.
Thus straight and curved belong to line,
odd and even, square and oblong to number... 24
(Post. An.
, 7 3a35 f f
)
In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle argues that only species
have essences: "Nothing, then, which is not a species
of a genus will have an essence - only species will have
it...", (10 30al2 )
.
It seems clear, then, that Aristotle is committed
to the view that numbers are species, and in the Physics
he says as much:
It is said rightly, too, that the number
of the sheep and of the dogs is the same
number if the two numbers are equal, but
not the same decad or the same ten... For
things are called the same so-and-so if
they do not differ by a differentia of that
thing, but not if they do... Therefore the
number of two groups also is the same num-
ber (for their number does not differ by a
differentia of number), but it is not the
same decad; for the things of which it is
asserted differ; one group are dogs, and
the other horses.
( Physics , 224a2 ff)
24. "Plane" composites are products of two other num-
bers, "solid" composites are products of three
other numbers. These are sometimes referred to as
squares and oblongs, respectively.
81
Socrates and Pythagoras are specifically the same, and
so are the same (kind of) animal. There are no differ-
entiae of the genus Animal by which they differ. But
nonetheless, they are not the same man, for there is a
difference in their matter. 25 Similarly, this ten, a
property of a group of dogs, is the same as that ten, a
property of a group of sheep, in so far as the numbers
are specifically the same. But this ten is not the same
(particular) ten as that, because the individuals in the
collections differ.
If 'two', 'three', etc., are names of species, that
is, if Number is a genus of which two, three, and the
other natural numbers are species, what are the differ-
entiae of those species? What is it that makes two
specifically different from three?
The Me taphysics D passage cited above, (page 79),
continues
:
For the essence of each number is that which
goes into it once; e.g. that of 6 is not
what goes twice or thrice, but what goes
once; for 6 is once 6. ...
. ^(Met . D, 10 20b8
)
And in the Physics we find:
25. It is a subject of some controversy whether sub-
stances are individuated on the basis of their
matter, but this is not of particular concern in
the present work.
82
. . . whereas number is of more units thanone, and specifically of "so-many", sothat you can not go back farther than theindivisible (for 'two' and 'three', thatis two ones and three ones, are both num-bers qua more than one, but different
numbers gua two and three respectively,
and so with the rest)
.
(Physics, 207bl2 ff; wicksteed and
Cornford translation)
In the Physics passage, we are told that a collec-
tion is numbered provided that it is a plurality.26
Which species of the genus the numerical property of
the collection falls under depends, apparently, upon
how many things are in the collection. It is perhaps
superfluous to point out the distinct ring of circular-
ity in this account.
The circularity is even more apparent in the Meta-
physics passage. There we are told that the essence of
6 is what it is once. Now a proper definition gives
txie essence of that which is defined, so it seems that
the definition of 'six' will be 'six ones'. If this is
also the genus-species definition, we are left uninformed.
The genus seems to be "ones", which fits nicely since it
can be taken to imply a measured plurality, that is, num-
ber. But to give "six" as the differentia of the species
26. Strictly speaking, it is numbered only if it is a
measured plurality, but this restriction may be im-
plied in the phrase "more than one". A tedious ar-
gument drawing out that implication is not to the
point here.
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S1X S6emS t0 be like
"man " as the differentia of
the species man.
It should be pointed out that the Metaphysics pas-
sage is not totally uninformative. We are told that the
essence of six is that it is six ones. Six is essentially
composed of six ones, and not essentially composed of two
three's or three two's. While it may be an essential at-
tribute of six that it is the product of two and three,
(since this follows from the definitions of six, two, and
three), it is unacceptable to offer "the product of two
and three" as a definition of six. But this does little
to alleviate the intellectual pain caused by the circu-
lairi-ty of the definition.
What can Aristotle be getting at in these passages?
Clearly two and three are both pluralities, and they
seem to be pluralities of different kinds. Three is
more than two - one is almost tempted to say that three
is more of a plurality than two. But the difference
cannot be one of degree of plurality, for things do not
partake of a genus in degrees: a thing either falls un-
der a genus or it does not. One has an intuitive sense
that the plurality of two is somehow different from the
plurality of three, but formulating that difference with-
out making refernce to number is, at best, a difficult
task, and Aristotle offers no help in the project.
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It is worth noting that this problem is not con-
fined to Aristotle's account of number. He is quite
prepared to speak of color as a genus, with the various
shades of color as species. Here again, the problem of
providing differentiae will be acute, perhaps even more
so than in the case of number. The integers at least
have the advantage of being discrete. The color spectrum
is continuous, and the prospects of providing differenti-
ae distinguishing green from blue which do not leave gaps
in the spectrum are not bright.
I do not profess to be able to give a completely
adequate account of the differentiae of the genus Number.
What I shall attempt to do is to provide some account of
the differentiae, an account of how we can distinguish
a number of one species from a number of another species,
and an account of why the natural numbers are ordered in
the usual way.
Number is so-many units. The differentiae of Num-
ber seem to be connected in some way with the quantity
of units. Arithmetic assumes both the existence and mean-
ing of units
. I take it that the force of assuming the
meaning" of unit is something like assuming that one can
recognize units and distinguish one from another. Thus,
when confronted with a plurality of things of some kind.
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it is assumed that one can recognize first that
a plurality, and second, what the individuals or
in the plurality are.
it is
units
Given this assumption and two pluralities, A and
B, one can determine whether or not A and B are of the
same number, that is, one can determine whether the
numerical property of A is of the same species as that
of B. One distinguishes the (potential) 27 units in A,
and those in B, and matches them one-to-one. One marks
off the individuals in A one at a time, and marks off
one individual in B for each one marked off in A. if
one exhausts the individuals of B before exhausting the
individuals of A, A is larger than B, and vice versa.
If A and B are exhausted together, then the number of
A is (specifically) the same as the number of B.
It should be noted that we need not restrict the
sort of comparison described in the preceeding para-
graph to pairs of collections which have a common meas-
ure, as we do in the case of Addition. Each of the
collections must have a measure - each collection must
be of individuals all of which fall under some single
genus or species - for otherwise the collections would
27. See page 68.
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not be numbered at all. But there need not be a single
measure which measures both collections. This is be-
cause comparing the two collections does not involve
combining them.
We can compare, with respect to number, a collec-
tion of goats with a collection of colors. All that is
required is that for each individual color that is
marked off, an individual goat is marked off as well.
The two collections remain quite distinct throughout.
In adding a number of goats to a number of colors, how-
ever, we are combining the two collections into one.
But the single collection which results from the com-
bination will not be measured, and hence not be num-
bered, because there is no measure common to goats and
colors. Thus, addition is precluded where mere compar-
ison is not.
How does the ordering of the species of Number
come about? The species will presumably be distinguish-
ed by differentiae of the genus Number, and those dif-
ferentiae will have something to do with quantity, since
Quantity is the category in which Number falls. Though
it is difficult to say precisely what the differentiae
are, we can say that two quantities differ with respect
to quantity when one is more and the other less. The
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relative terms 'more' and 'less', which have primary
application in the category of Quantity, thus provide
a key to the differentiae of the species of Number, and
it will be through those differentiae that the ordering
of numbers comes about.
Aristotle consistently maintains that one is not
a number. 28 The first number, then, is two, and that
two is the first number can be shown by appeal to the
relative terms 'more' and 'less'. Two is the first
number because every other number is more than it;
when any two-collection is compared with any other num-
bered collection which is not a two-collection, the
two-collection will be exhausted before the other col-
lection. ^Three is the next number because it is more
than two by only one. Those collections are three which,
when compared with a two-collection, have one individual
constituent remaining when the two—collection is ex-
hausted. Thus, there can be no number greater than two
but less than three. 2 ^ The ordering of the species of
28. Since Number is a plurality of a certain kind,
namely measured plurality, and since one, or a unit,
in so far as it is a unit, is not a plurality at all,
one can not fall under the genus Number. (cf. Met. I
105 3a26 - 30) .
29. Aristotle construes fractions as ratios of numbers.
They are not themselves numbers.
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Number by reference to the relative terms 'more 1 and
r less
' leads to an ordering which proceeds by the addi-
tion of ones
,
a procedure which Aristotle seems to be
m sympathy, (cf. Metaphysics M, particularly chapter
vii)
.
One might then offer a recursive account of the
differentiae of Number:
The differentia of two is "one more than one".
The differentia of three is "one more than two".The differentia of n+1 is "one more than n".
The recursive process gets started because one is not
a number, and hence need not be provided with a dif-
ferentia of Number.
Given a collection of things, how does one deter-
mine what numerical property that collection has? The
obvious answer is that one counts the things in the
c llection
,
but what guarantee is there that counting
will give the correct answer? What does counting a-
mount to?
I think that counting can be viewed in this context
as a series of successive comparisons. Counting is a
well-defined procedure for constructing collections whose
numbers we know. We compare the constructed collections
with the collection whose number we want to know. When
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we find a constructed collection whose number is equal
to that of the collection in question, „e know that the
number of the collection with which we started is (spe-
cifically) the same as that of the constructed collec-
tion whose number we know.
The collections we construct in counting are sim-
ply sub-collections of the collection whose number we
want to determine. We start with a plurality, and pick
one of the individuals in the plurality. We consider
that part of the plurality both as a separate entity
and as a part of the total. Thus, in marking off one
in the sub-collection, we are also marking off one in
the total collection. We note that the collection has
not been exhausted by marking off this part, so we know
collection is more than one. We now compare
the collection to a sub-collection whose number is two,
by adding one individual of the collection to the indi-
vidual first isolated. Again, we note that the collec-
tion is not exhausted, so that its number must be more
than two. We add another individual to the sub-collec-
tion and compare the whole collection to this part. We
continue this procedure until we reach an (improper)
sub-collection whose number is the same as that of the
whole collection, because the whole collection is ex-
hausted when all of the individuals of the sub-collec-
tion have been marked off. We know the number of the
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sub-collection, because we have generated the sub-col-
lections by adding ones, and hence we know the differ-
entia of each sub-collection. And we know that the
number of the collection is equal to the number of
that sub-collection, so we know the number of the col-
lection.
A picture may be helpful here. Consider a col-
lection of marbles in a box:
0 0
0 0
I want to determine how many marbles are in the box.
begin by moving one marble over, marking it off. The
situation is now this:
0 0
0 0
I have picked out a sub collection of the collection,
and now compare the quantity of the collection to that
of the sub-collection. I mark off the one I have segre-
gated, thus exhausting the sub-collection. But I have
at the same time marked off a one in the total collection,
so I have matched the individuals in the sub-collection
with those in the whole collection one-to-one. I note
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that the collection has not been exhausted, so I know
that the collection is more than one - it is numbered.
I therefore compare it with a sub-collection whose num-
ber is two, constructed by adding another individual to
the one already segregated. I know that this sub-col-
lection is a two because I know that it is one more
than one, and this is the differentia of two. I compare
the total collection to this sub-collection as before,
and note that the collection is not exhausted when the
sub-collection is. So I repeat the procedure, construc-
ting a three-sub-collection and comparing the collection
with it. When I construct the four sub-collection, I
find that matching the individuals in it with those in
the collection exhausts the collection, and so the num-
ber of the collection is the same as that of the sub-
collection, whose number I know to be four.
No doubt a good deal more remains to be said about
Number: the relative nature of numbers is of interest,
as is the counterfactual nature of certain Arithmetical
claims. But such considerations go beyong the limited
scope of this chapter. The goal at the outset was three-
fold: first, to determine what genus Arithmetic inves-
tigates; second, to give an account of the existence
of that genus in terms of the existence of the individu-
9-2
als falling under species of the genus; and third, to
show that the existence of those individuals is depen-
dent upon the existence of substance.
The first two parts of that goal have been reached:
the genus of Arithmetic is Number, the individual num-
bers are quantitative properties of collections of
things. But what of the third point? How is the exis-
tence of Number dependent upon the existence of sub-
stances?
Numbers are properties of collections. Were there
no collections, there would be no numbers, for there
would be no properties of collections. But collections
are collections of things: collections of substances,
qualities, etc. The things in a collection must fall
into the various categories, and the existence of things
in any category depends upon the existence of substances.
Thus, since the existence of numbers depends upon the
existence of collections, and the existence of collections
depends upon the existence of substances
,
the appropriate
dependence of the existence of Number on the existence of
substances is established.
CHAPTER iv
THE GENUS OF GEOMETRY
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Because so much of geometric reasoning involves
appeal to various geometric figures, it is natural
to suppose that Geometry is a science which investi-
gates the essential natures of such figures as cubes,
parallelograms, etc. In seeking the genus knowledge
of whose essential nature is the goal of Geometry,
one's first inclination is to suppose that that genus
is Geometric Figure, perhaps with Plane Figure and
Solid Figure as sub-genera. Triangle, Square, etc.,
would be species of the former, and Cube, Sphere, etc.,
species of the latter. Such a view is supported by
taphy sics D, where Aristotle says:
There is genus in the sense in which 'plane'
is the genus of plane figures and 'solid'
of solids; for each of the figures is in
the one case a plane of such and such a
and in the other a solid of such and
such a kind; and this is what underlies
the differentiae.
(Met . D, 1024bl ff)
If Geometric Figure is the genus of Geometry, some
account of the existence of that genus must be offered.
Platonism is unacceptable to Aristotle, so we cannot
suppose that geometric figures exist independently of
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the mind in a realm of non-sensible
, abstract entities.
N°r
'
if Geometric Figure is the genus of Geometry, can
we suppose that the geometric figures exist only in
the mind, for the reasons offered in chapter one. in
order to make good the claim that Geometric Figure is
the genus of Geometry, one must provide an account of
the existence of triangles, spheres, etc., in terms
of the existence of sensible substances.
Metaphysics M.3, Aristotle offers as one char-
acterization of geometric objects and their existence
For just as there can be many propositions
about things merely qua movable, without
essential reference to the nature of each
one or to their attributes, and it does
not necessarily follow from this either that
there is something movable which exists in
separation from sensible things or that
there is a distinct movable nature in sen-
sible things; so too there will be propo-
sitions and sciences which apply to movable
things not qua movable
,
but qua corporeal
only; and again qua planes only and qua
lines only, and qua divisible, and qua in-
divisible but having position, and qua in-
divisible. Therefore, since it is true to
say in a general sense not only that things
which are separable but that things which
are inseparable exist, e.g. that movable
things exist, it is also true to say in a
general sense that mathematical objects
exist, and in such a form as mathematicians
describe them. . . If the things of which it
[geometry] treats are accidentally sensible
although it does not treat of them qua sen-
sible, it does not follow that the mathe-
matical sciences treat of sensible things -
nor, on the other hand, that they treat of
other things which exist independently apart
fr°m thSSe
- (Met. M, 1077b24 ff)
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This passage suggests that geometric objects sim-
ply are sensible objects, thought about in a certain
way - in particular, thought of without regard to any
properties except those connected in some appropriate
way with the extendedness of the object in question.
Perhaps the most natural way to understand such a
doctrine, if Geometric Figure is the genus of Geometry,
is to take as geometric objects circles, cubes, etc.,
and attribute to them the same sort of existence attri-
buted to colors: an existence dependent upon their
inhering in sensible substances as properties. Colors
exist because sensible substances are colored; circles
and cubes exist because there are circular and cubical
sensible substances: circles and cubes are the shapes
of certain sensible substances.
But such a view cannot be attributed to Aristotle.
He does not think that the shapes of sensible substances
fulfill the definitions of the geometer, (cf
. ,
e.g.
,
Metaphysics M.2). For Aristotle, no physical object is
spherical or cubical, strictly speaking. No sensible
substance fulfills the definition of a triangle. Cer-
tainly, if any shapes are to be our geometric objects,
those shapes are triangles and the like, not shapes
which approximate them, however closely. The theorems
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of Geometry are about the former, not the latter. Yet
it is the latter, not the former, which are the shapes
of sensible substances.
One might at this point look to the Physics, where,
at 193b24, we find:
... for natural bodies have surfaces and
occupy spaces, have lengths and presentpoints, all of which are subjects of
mathematical study... Physicists, astron-
omers, and mathematicians, then, all haveto deal with lines, figures, and the
rest. But the mathematician is not con-
cerned with these concepts qua boundaries
of natural bodies, nor with their properties
as manifested in such bodies. Thereforehe abstracts them from physical conditions.
Noting this passage, one might be tempted to argue as
follows: the fact that no sensible substances have
shapes which precisely fulfill the definitions of geo-
metric figures may be merely contingent; it is, at
most, a matter of physical necessity. What Aristotle
proposes is that geometers abstract from all of the
physical conditions of sensible substances when reason
ing about them geometrically. So the geometer can ab-
stract from the physical impossibility, and suppose
that the sensible substance in question is cubical,
spherical, or whatever.
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Such an argument is misguided. I do not dispute
for a moment the claim that, if we ignore all conditions
imposed by physical necessity, we can imagine a sensible
substance which is precisely cubical. a similar claim,
in fact, will function in an important way in my own
proposal. But our ability to imagine such a sensible
substance does not mitigate the fact that no such sub-
stance actually exists. Any pure shape which we reach
by abstracting the other properties of a sensible sub-
stance will be the shape of that substance. Abstract-
ing other properties of a sensible substance from its
shape does not alter in any way the shape of that sub-
stance. Thus, if no perfectly square sensible sub-
stances exist, we will not arrive at a square by sub-
tracting properties like weight, color, etc., from any
sensible substance. So, whatever our imaginative pow-
e s, it is still true that Geometric Figure does not
exist as a genus for Geometry, if its existence is de-
pendent upon geometric figures being the shapes of
some actual sensible substances.
A promising move suggested to me by Robert Sleigh
is to grant that geometric figures are not the shapes
of sensible substances we encounter in experience, but
allow that we can, at least in principle, produce sen-
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sible substances of the appropriate sort, and identi-
fy the geometric objects with the shapes of these.
That is, we may not be able to find a sensible sub-
stance which is in fact cubical, but we can find one
which is a close approximation to a cube. Then, we
might "extract” a cube from this sensible substance by
cutting away the irregular parts, much as a sculptor
extracts a statue from marble by cutting away the ex-
traneous pieces. Let me refer to such theoretically
extractable substances as inherent substances. Cubical
and spherical substances might then be said to exist in
other sensible substances, as inherent substances. We
might then identify the geometric objects with the
shapes of certain of these inherent substances.
We should be cautious here. It is not clear that
we can assert that these inherent substances actually
exist as parts of the sensible substances which we en-
counter. The Categories suggests that there is no gen-
eral prohibition against one substance being "in" another
as part in whole
:
The fact that the parts of substances appear
to be present in the whole as in a subject,
should not make us apprehensive lest we should
have to admit that such parts are not sub-
stances, for in explaining the phrase 'being
present in a subject', we stated that we meant
'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.
(Cat., 3a28
)
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But we saw in the last chapter that Metaphysics z
precludes the possibility of any substance existing
actually and functioning as part of another substance,
(see pages 67 - 68). Any substance-like part of a sub-
stance, ( a hand, for example ), is only potentially a
substance. I would contend, therefore, that the in-
herent substances are only potentially existent, not
actually so, and their shapes are only potentially
existent as well. The proponent of the inherent sub-
stance view may accept this result, and point out that
the view that geometric objects exist only potentially
is at least suggested by Aristotle at Metaphysics
1078a30, if we accept the suggestion of Tredennik and
Armstrong that 'matter' refers to potentiality:
«-v 3
Hence for this reason the geometricians are
in what they maintain, and treat
of what really exists; i.e., the objects
of geometry really exist. For things can
exist in two ways, either in complete re-
ality or as matter.
In his influential paper, "Aristotle on Geometrical
Objects ,3^ ian Mueller offers an interpretation on which
the connection between geometric figures and sensible
substances is more subtle than any we have considered sc
far. Mueller recognizes the need for providing for some
30. Op. cit.
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connection between the objects of Geometry, (which he
takes to be the geometric figures), and the Physical
world
:
“Z uAristotle is not willing to construemathematical objects as merely mental
construction 3 dependent on human thoughtfor their existence. Aristotle, of coursedoes place emphasis on the role of human
'
thinking m Mathematics but he also acceptsthe Platonic assumption that there must bea significant correlation between the
aP
?
a
f?
nt ob 3 ects of mathematical reasoning
and the real world. 31
But he does not construe geometric figures as properties
of sensible substances at all. Rather, geometric fig-
ures are particular entities consisting of geometric
properties imposed upon intelligible matter. The intel-
ligible matter underlying these geometric properties
also underlies the sensible properties had by sensible
substances :
There is
,
then, at least an initial plausi-
in supposing Aristotle to have en-
tertained a conception of mathematical ob-jects, not as matterless properties, but
as substance-like individuals with a special
matter - intelligible matter. 32
Regardless of how he treats points, Aristotle
seems to have the idea of the purely dimen-
sional underlying other properties. In part,
this is the idea of the three-dimensional
underlying sensible properties in the physical
31. Ibid
,
page 157.
32. Ibid
,
page 164.
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if^nv f°r Arist°tle, there is little
£hat of tte
S
o
en
!
e betWeen this ^ea and
al underlyingHgeome trie properties^hich"'he calls intelligible matte?? ' Ch 33
Mueller's account involves drawing a direct paral-
lel between sensible substances and geometric figures:
sensible objects consist of physical matter formed in
a certain way through the imposition of physical proper
ties; geometric objects consist of intelligible matter
formed in a certain way through the imposition of geo-
metric properties. Geometric objects are what Mueller
refers to as geometric particulars: a particular par-
cel of intelligible matter with the form of a square,
a particular parcel of intelligible matter with the
form of a tetrahedron, etc.
There are four major points to Mueller's interpre-
tation :
1) Geometric objects are particular straight and
curved lines, triangles, spheres, etc.;
2) These geometric particulars consist of intelligi-
ble matter, on which are imposed geometric properties:
straightness, triangularity, etc.;
3) Because intelligible matter, extension, underlies
sensible properties, geometry has application to sensi-
33. Ibid
,
page 166.
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ble substances. (On page 161, Mueller says: "Mathe-
matics is applicable to reality whereas the study of
forms advocated by Plato has no application whatsoever.
In the sequel I will argue that Aristotle explains
this applicability by considering mathematical objects
to underlie physical reality").
4) The universality of the theorems of geometry a-
nses out of reasoning about the geometric particulars
in a special way, viz., conceptually.
As an account of geometric figures and their
existence, Mueller's interpretation of Aristotle has
much to recommend it, and similarities will be evident
between his account and my own to be offered later.
But the tone of Mueller's paper suggests that he is
trying to do more than simply explain what geometric
figures are and how they exist. He attempts to explain
why geometric knowledge is applicable to sensible real-
ity by explaining how geometric figures are related to
sensible substances, and this suggests that, on Mueller's
view, Geometry is a science of or about geometric fig-
ures: that Geometric Figure is the genus whose essen-
tial nature Geometry investigates. If this is what
Mueller has in mind, I think that his account fails.
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If Geometric Figure is the genus of Geometry, then
geometric figures ought to have an existence indepen-
dent of mind. This is a point which, as we have seen,
Mueller himself grants, and it is one which seems to be
at the heart of Aristotelian philosophy of science.
But does Mueller's account give us geometric figures
which are not mentally dependent?
On page 163, Mueller says: "Consequently, the ob-
jects in terms of which mathematical argument proceeds
are intuitively perceived or imagined spatial objects,
points, plane figures, solids". If the spatial objects
are imagined, I take it the picture is something like
this: the mathematician derives intelligible matter,
or a concept of it, by abstracting from sensible sub-
stances their sensible properties, thus obtaining the
quantitative and continuous in three dimensions. The
mathematician then imposes, in imagination, certain
properties on that intelligible matter, namely, geomet-
ric properties like straightness, triangularity, etc.
The result is a geometric particular about which the
geometer reasons.
A problem arises in reconciling this picture with
the requirement that mathematical objects be independent
of human thought, non-mental. For on this picture, all
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that exists as a qualification of substance is intelli-
gible matter. The geometric figures themselves arise
only as a result of a mental process: the imposition
in imagination of geometric properties on intelligible
matter. Obviously, if no minds existed, neither would
geometric objects, on this account, and this result is
precisely one which Mueller seeks to avoid.
The situation is not much improved if we adopt the
other alternative suggested by Mueller, and suppose that
these geometric figures are not imagined but apprehended
by intuition. The idea here is presumably that the geo-
metric properties are imposed upon intelligible matter
independently of human thought or perception, in the
same way that physical properties are imposed upon
physical matter. Geometric objects exist independently
of the mind, are merely apprehended by intuition, and
then reasoned about. This avoids making geometric fig-
ures mental entities, but is open to other objections.
Let us consider some particular parcel of intelli-
gible matter, that underlying the sensible properties
of the desk on which I am now working. To preserve a
non-mental existence for Mueller's geometric figures,
we must suppose that that parcel has certain figure-
properties, like squareness, triangularity, etc., inde-
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pendently of any ratiocination on our part. Now it is
surely implausible to suppose that when I look at my
desk, and disregard all of its sensible properties, (if
it is even possible to do this), I apprehend, by intui-
tion or anything else, some set of geometric figures.
If I apprehend any shape at all when I abstract all
sensible properties, it would seem to be the shape of
my desk. That surely will not serve Mueller's purpose,
for he rejects the view that geometric figures are
shapes of sensible substances. Yet to claim that ab-
straction of sensible properties leaves me with the
apprehension of some specifiable set of geometric par-
ticulars is, at best, untrue.
There is a further problem for Mueller's view, if
he is proposing Geometric Figure as the genus for Geo-
metry. Mueller recognizes that geometric knowledge must
applicability to the sensible world. On his view,
geometric knowledge will be knowledge of the essential
nature of such things as triangles and cubes. This
knowledge, we are told, will be applicable to sensible
substances because the same matter which underlies the
geometric properties also underlies the sensible prop-
erties of substances. But what reason is there to sup-
pose that any knowledge of the essential nature of ob-
jects consisting of intelligible matter with certain
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very peculiar properties, properties never to be met
with in sensible substances themselves, will be applic-
able to those substances, which have properties of a
very different sort? What, if anything, do we learn
about intelligible matter itself in studying geometric
figures, that we could then apply to objects of an en-
tirely different sort simply in virtue of the fact that
the same intelligible matter is somehow associated with
them?
When we study sensible substances, we learn about
the forms of those substances, their essential and
accidental properties. We learn nothing about their
matter, qua matter. The behaviour and characteristics
of such objects are explained by reference to their
forms. If we are to take Mueller's analogy between ge-
ometric objects and sensible substances seriously, it
would seem that geometric knowledge is knowledge of
form, not of matter; and in the Posterior Analytics,
Aristotle says: "For the mathematical sciences concern
forms; they do not demonstrate properties of a sub-
stratum. .
. ,
(79a9 ) . So it is difficult to see how an
investigation of the forms of objects with peculiar
formal properties could yield useful information about
objects with very different formal features, simply in
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virtue of the fact that the matter of the former "in
some sense underlies" the properties of the latter.
Let me clarify the scope of my objections to
Mueller. it is my view that his account of geometric
objects is, on the whole, attractive, when it is as-
sumed that particular geometric figures are mental
constructions: when the imposition of geometric prop-
erties on intelligible matter is taken to be an ac-
tivity of the mind. My own account of geometric fig-
ures will be very close to this interpretation of
Mueller. What I have been arguing is that Mueller's
account is not sufficient to warrant taking Geometric
Figure as the genus of Geometry: it does not justify
the supposition that the essential natures of geometric
figures are an appropriate subject of investigation for
Geometry. If geometric figures are imagined spatial
entities, we are left with a Constructivist ontology for
Geometry. If they are not imagined, it is difficult to
determine just where and how they do exist. And in
either case, the applicability of knowledge of the es-
sential nature of Geometric Figure to sensible sub-
stances is left unexplained.
There is a general objection to all of the inter-
pretations which suppose that it is knowledge of the
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essential natures of geometric figures that is the goal
of Geometry. No such interpretation fits well with the
crucial texts.
In Metaphysics M, Aristotle repeatedly characterizes
Geometry as the investigation of the essential attributes
of sensible substances qua quantitative and continuous
in three dimensions. But Aristotle also rejects the view
that the shapes of sensible substances fulfill the geo-
meter's definitions. So one cannot reason about a sensi-
ble substance qua cube, because no sensible substance is
cubical. The gua-account of geometric objects is simply
incompatible with the view that those objects are geo-
metric figures.
The Sleigh proposal is of no help here, because
Aristotle does not say that the geometer reasons about
something in a man qua extended, but that he reasons
about a man qua extended. Indeed, he argues at length
that mathematical objects are not in sensible substances
at all.
In Metaphysics K, Aristotle characterizes the geo-
meter's endeavour as follows:
. . . for before beginning his investigation
he strips off all the sensible qualities...
and leaves only the quantitative and con-
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^°US ' sometimes in one, sometimes in two
bates ofthe dimenSions ' the attf-
ous and dof ^ quantitative and continu-
respect fd p not . conslde r them in any other, and examines the relative positionsof some and the attributes of these and the
commensurabilities and incommensurabilities
of others, and the ratios of others; but
thio
e
nh°
S:lt °ne and the same science of allese things - Geometry.
.
.
(Met.. K, 1061a29 ff)
In the Posterior Analytics
, we find:
Now the things peculiar to the science, theexistence of which must be assumed, are thethings with reference to which the scienceinvestigates
. the essential attributes, e.q.
arithmetic with reference to units, andgeometry with reference to points and lines.
(Post. An.
, 76a31
)
As we have already seen, 34 Aristotle offers points,
lines, planes, and solids as the objects of geometric
investigation in the Physics
. No where does he even
mention or suggest Geometric Figure as the genus of Geo-
rt ;try
.
I propose that we accept the suggestion in the
Physics and take as the objects of geometric study points,
(zero-dimensional extension), lines, (one-dimensional ex-
tension), planes, (two-dimensional extension), and solids,
(three-dimensional extension). In other words, we take
Extension to be the genus whose essential nature Geometry
investigates, and construe zero-, one-, two-, and three-
34. See page 96.
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dimensional extension as species of that genus.
This interpretation fits well with the passages
from both Metaphysics M and Metaphysics K. in discov-
ering the essential nature of the species of extension,
the geometer is at the same time discovering the essen-
tial attributes of substances qua extended in one, two,
or three dimensions. The existence of these geometric
objects is independent of mind, but dependent on the
existence of sensible substances. One- and two-dimen-
sional extension exist as restrictions or limits of
three-dimensional extension, but three-dimensional ex-
tension itself exists only because there are three-dimen-
sional objects, sensible substances. Were there no sen-
sible substances, there would be nothing extended, and
so no Extension.
What, then, is the status of geometric figures: of
triangles, cubes, and the rest? Since knowledge of the
essential natures of geometric figures is not the primary
or proper goal of Geometry, we need not feel constrained
to give an account of the existence of geometric figures
which makes that existence independent of mind. The
proper concern of Geometry is the discovery of the essen-
tial nature of Extension, and Extension exists whether
geometric figures do or not.
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I have little to say against one who is attracted
either by the inherent substance account of geometric
figures
,
or by the view that particular parcels of in-
telligible matter underlying particular sensible sub-
stances have imposed upon them geometric forms like
triangularity, sphericity, etc., different from the
actual shapes of those substances. I find the former
view unattractive because the inherent substances are
only potentially existent, so their shapes are poten-
tially existent as well. Moreover, that view seems to
be contradicted by Aristotle's remark in Metaphysics B,
(1002a20)
. Besides this, no sort of shape is present
m the solid more than any other; so that if the Hermes
is not m the stone, neither is the half of the cube in
the cube as something determinate..." The latter view
simply strikes me as being terribly implausible.
It seems to me to be preferable to construe geomet-
ric figures as purely conceptual tools, theoretical en-
tities which the geometer employs to facilitate his in-
vestigation of the essential nature of Extension. In
investigating the essential nature of lines, the geometer
is reasoning about lengths. The knowledge which he ac-
quires is applicable to sensible substances in so far
as one is concerned to know what is true of a substance
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in virtue of the fact that it has a given length, with-
out regard to its width, depth, or other sensible prop-
erties. Often, the geometer is concerned with relation
al properties holding among several lines: given that
three lines are related in such and such a way, what
other relations must hold among them? It is simply
easier to keep track of a single entity which is tri-
angular than it is to keep track of three entities
with certain relations holding among them, so the geo-
meter unifies the entities and relations, and forms a
picture or concept of a single entity - a triangle.
In so far as the definitions of geometric figures
are taken to be definitions of individuals of some sort
the things defined exist only in the mind. Geometric
figures, as unified entities, are the peculiar objects
of thought discussed in the passage quoted from Meta-
physics L in chapter one. The thought of a geometric
figure and the geometric figure are one and the same -
there is nothing distinct from the mind of which the
mind is thinking. The mind, having adopted the form of
a triangle, is the triangle it is thinking about, and
there is no triangle anywhere else.
This interpretation finds some support in Metaphys-
ics Z, where Aristotle says:
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circle*" 2*^1 3 circle ' is the same as thee, and being a soul' the same as the
indi" •h
BU
!
: WhSn WS C°me t0 the concretevidual, e.g., this circle, i. e . one ofthe individual circles, whether perceptibleor intelligible (I mean by intelligible
circles the mathematical, and by perceptiblecircles those of bronze and of wood)
of these there is no definition, but' theyare known by the aid of intuitive thinking
or of perception; and when they pass out
of this complete realization it is not
clear whether they exist or not.
(Met, z, 10 36al ff)
Mathematical circles have, as their realm of "complete
realization/' thought. Aristotle is not prepared to
commit himself on whether these particular mathematical
circles exist when they are not being thought about,
but on the proposal being put forward here, they do not.
A particular mathematical circle is the result of the
mind's adopting a certain form, and, as soon as the mind
ceases to have that form, (as soon as it stops thinking
of the circle)
,
the circle ceases to exist.
But the definitions of geometric figures can also
be understood, not as definitions of things of some sort
but as prescriptions or recipes for relating lines or
planes in certain ways: a square consists of four lines
related in such and such a way; a cube consists of six
planes related in such and such a way; and so forth.
Thus understood, the definitions are not definitions of
individual, unified entities at all. Rather, geometric
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figures are complexes of entities related in specified
ways, and the defintions of these figures are merely
stipulations of what entities are to be related and
what relations are to hold among them. When geometric
figures are construed as complexes or relational enti-
ties, even the knowledge of geometric figures acquired
by the geometer need not be taken to be about entities
which do not in any way exist in the sensible world.
Rather, knowledge of geometric figures is knowledge a-
bout the relational properties of entities which do
exist m the sensible world, as quantitative properties
of sensible substances.
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CHAPTER v
INFINITY
The discussion of the ontological foundations of
mathematics has centered on the existence of the genera
whose essential attributes the mathematical sciences
investigate. If Aristotle's account of demonstrate
science in general, and mathematics in particular, is
correct, the justification of the ontological presup-
positions of mathematics is now complete. Theoretic-
ally at least, in so far as Arithmetic and Geometry
make appeal to a notion of infinity, the nature of the
infinite should be deducible from the basic premisses
of those sciences. But the notion of infinity is suf-
ficiently obscure, and its role in both Arithmetic and
Geometry sufficiently important, that a separate dis-
c ission of Aristotle's account of infinity is well
worth while.
Aristotle s roost thorough discussion of infinity
is to be found in Physics G, chapters four through
eight. Much of what he says there is repeated in Meta-
phys i cs K, chapter ten. The account in the Metaphysics
is abbreviated, and offers no significant additions to
the Physics account, so the discussion here will focus
exclusively on the Physics.
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Aristotle argues, in chapters four and five of
gjgS1CS G ' that there is n° actual complete infinity.
To summarize those arguments:
The infinite does not exist either as a substance
or as a principle of substances. Were the infinite a
substance
,
as Plato and the Pythagoreans maintained,
it would be, qua infinite, indivisible, just as a man
qua man is indivisible. But this, Aristotle maintains,
is not what is meant by those who say that the infinite
exists. 'The infinite' is supposed to refer to some-
thing which, though it can be traversed or gone through
partially
,
can not be traversed or gone through com-
pletely. But what can be traversed even partially is
divisible, because all motion is divisible. On the
other hand, were the infinite to exist as a material
principle of substances, as Anaximander proposes, then
parts of the infinite would be infinite, just as parts
of air are air. "But the same thing cannot be many in-
finities
,
(204a25)
,
so the infinite cannot be of this
nature. Moreover:
Everything can be resolved into the elements
of which it is composed. Hence the body in
question would have been present in our world
here, alongside air and fire and earth and
water: but nothing of the kind is observed.
(Phys
. ,
204b33 ff
)
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When we analyze the sensible objects around us, we find
them to be composed of the elements, and in no case do
we find anything other than these elements, as we should
if the infinite were a material principle.
The infinite, then, does not have a substantive
existence: it is neither a substance nor the material
principle of a substance. 'The infinite' is the nominal-
ization of an adjective, (204a29). Just as 'the red'
may be used to refer to, say, some particular red chair,
so 'the infinite' might refer to something. But infin-
ity is no more the essence of that to which 'the infin-
ite refers, if it does refer, than redness is the essence
of a red chair. Infinity, if it exists at all, exists
as a quantitative property of something whose essence
neither is nor includes "to be infinite".
But infinity is not an actual quantitative property
of any body. No one of the elements can be infinite in
quantity, nor can more than one element be infinite in
quantity. The former follows from the fact that each
element has a contrary opposed to it, and an infinite
quantity of one would have destroyed any finite quantity
of its contrary. The latter is impossible because
"'Body 1 is what has extension in all directions and the
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infinite is what is boundlessly extended, so that the
infinite body would be extended in all directions ad
infinitum", (204b20)
. Hence there could not be two
such bodies, because they would limit one another.
There cannot be an infinite multiplicity of elements,
because this would violate the doctrine that every
element has a natural place, (presumably, because there
are not infinitely many places in the finite universe).
Finally, there is no infinite sensible body, for the
very good reason that we do not observe any such body.
Infinity does not exist as a substance, as men and
horses do, nor does it exist as a property of substance.
It seems to follow from this, together with Aristotle's
general metaphysical position, that everything that
®xi.s>ts is either a substance or a gualification of sub-
stance, that infinity does not exist in any sense at
34. The absence of criticism of the arguments sketched
should not be interpreted as endorsement of those
arguments. It is no doubt an interesting question
whether Aristotle's views on Physics genuinely forced
upon him the conclusion that there could be no infin-
ite body, but that question lies outside the range
of my concerns here. What is important is that Ari-
stotle held that there could be no infinite magni-
tude. The interesting question then becomes, what
limitations, if any, does Aristotle's position on
infinity place upon mathematics as an Aristotelian
science?
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Aristotle, however
conclusion that nothing
is not prepared to accept
is in any sense infinite:
the
infinite doe^^ ^ t0 suPPose that theoes not exist in any way leads
there^iL^ ““k imPossible consequences:here will be a beginning and an end of timea magn1^ will not be divisible into mag-nitudes, number will not be infinite. ifln
Ti
SW of
.
the above considerations'
neither alternative seems possible, an ar-biter must be called in; clearly there isa sense in which the infinite exists and
another m which it does not.
(Phys . , 206a ff
)
My concern in this chapter is to spell out the sense in
which the infinite exists, and discuss the consequences
of that account for the mathematical sciences.
Having argued against the possibility of an infinite
extension or an infinite body, Aristotle begins his posi-
tive account of what infinity is and in what sense it
exists
:
We must keep in mind that the word 'is'
means either what potentially is or what
fully is
.
Further, a thing is infinite either by
addition or by division.
Now, as we have seen, magnitude is not
actually infinite. But by division it is
infinite... The alternative then remains
that the infinite has a potential exis-
tence .
But the phrase 'potential existence' is
ambiguous
. When we speak of the potential
existence of a statue we mean that there
will be an actual statue. It is not so
with the infinite. There will not be an
actual infinite.
(Phys
.
,
206al4 ff)
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Focusing on just this much of Aristotle's account,
one is tempted to interpret him as distinguishing be-
tween two kinds of potentiality: some things have a
potentiality that will at some time be actualized,
while other things have a potentiality that will never
be actualized. 35 The latter kind of potentiality be-
longs to things which are always potentially existent,
never actually so, and infinity exists in the sense
that it has this sort of potential existence.
But does it make sense to speak of a potentiality
that can never be actualized? Aristotle consistently
maintains that actuality is prior to potentiality, and
consistently elucidates the notion of potentiality in
terms of actuality, (cf., for example, Metaphysics e.
chapters seven through nine). Actuality is primary,
potentiality secondary and dependent upon actuality.
Thus it is not clear that the notion of a potentiality
that could never be actualized even makes sense. Indeed,
if rx is potentially F*1 is to be understood as rIf A, B,
-JC, then x will be F
,
the notion of an unactuaiizable
potentiality becomes vacuous
,
because the consequent of
the conditional is always false. This has led some phil-
35. See Evans, Melbourne G.
,
Aristotle
.
The Physical Philosophy of
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osophers to attribute to Aristotle a "principle of
plenitude", 36 which Jaakko Hintikka formulates roughly
as, "... no genuine possibility can remain unactualized
through an infinity of time ".37 The view that infinity
exists potentially but never actually is incompatible
with this principle.
One could argue, of course, that the principle of
plenitude applies only to those potentialities which
are potentialities of the first kind: that potentiality
involved in the potential existence of a statue. The
principle of plenitude is inapplicable to potentiality
of the second kind, that kind which is ascribed to the
existence of infinity. But this leaves one puzzling
°ver the meaning of an expression of the form: ^x is
potentially F, but cannot be actually F*7 .
In order to bring Aristotle's views on infinity in-
\
to line with the principle of plenitude, Hintikka argues
that Aristotle is neither distinguishing senses of 'po-
tentiality' nor maintaining that infinity never actually
3 8exists. Rather, Aristotle is distinguishing a peculiar
36. The name is introduced by A. 0. Love joy in The Great
Chain of Being
,
Harvard University Press, 1942.
37. Hintikka, Jaakko, "Aristotelian Infinity"
.
38. Ibid.
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sense in which 'exists* is being used when it is said
that infinity exists. The Physics continues:
he word is has many senses, and we saythat the infinite 'is' in the sense in
which we say 'it is day' or 'it is thegames', because one thing after anotheris always coming into existence. For ofthese things too the distinction betweenpotential and actual existence holds.
We say that there are Olympic games,both in the sense that they may occur
and that they are actually occurring...
For generally the infinite has this mode
of existence: one thing is always being
taken from another, and each thing thatis taken is always finite but always dif-ferent.
(Phys . , 206 a 20 ff
)
What Hintikka suggests, on the basis of this pas-
sage, is that it is quite true to say that the infinite
cannot exist actually, if what is meant is that it can-
not be that all of the infinite is actualized at some
particular instant of time. But, he argues, in that
sense of exists'
,
the infinite does not exist poten-
tially either. Rather, the sense in which infinity
exists potentially is precisely the sense in which it
exists actually: as an attribute of a process or se-
quence of events or things. There is never a time at
which a process is, in its entirety, actual, although
there are times when it is true to say that the process
has, in its entirety, been actualized. Rather, the pro-
cess is actualized over an interval of time, and at any
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moment during that interval it is correct to say that
the process is actual, in the sense that the process
being actualized.
is
Thus, a line is infinitely divisible, not in the
sense that it is potentially infinitely divided but
never actually so, but rather in the sense that there
is a process of dividing the line which can be carried
on indefinitely. To say that a line is divisible is
to say that there is a procedure for dividing the line;
to say that a line is infinitely divisible is to say
that there is a procedure for dividing the line which
may be repeated without limit. That process or pro-
cedure may exist actually, when someone is dividing
the line
, or it may exist potentially, when no one is
dividing the line. Similarly, the property of being
infinite, which belongs to the process, may be actually
existent, (when the process is actually existent), or
potentially existent.
Hintikka interprets Aristotle's view as taking
infinity to be an attribute of a process: "In other
words, infinity is not a term which applies to individu-
al- things, such as men or houses, either actually or
potentially. Rather, it is an attribute of certain se-
quences of individual things or individual events..." 39
39. Ibid
, p. 199.
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One might wonder why the infinite cannot simply be iden-
tified with the process itself, as Aristotle himself
seems to suggest when he describes infinity as a thing
"whose being... consists in a process of coming to be
or passing away; definite if you like at each stage,
yet always different",
( 206 a 32 ).
Such an identification would be a mistake. One of
Aristotle's objections to the view that the infinite is
a substance is that, if it were a substance, it would
not be divisible qua infinite. The same holds true
for processes: they are divisible only because they
involve movement of some sort, ('movement' is being
used here with the very broad sense that Aristotle gives
the term and movement is divisible only be-
cause the distance or magnitude covered by the movement
is divisible. Thus, if infinity is identical with a
process, it is not divisible qua infinite, because a
process is not divisible qua process.
The temptation to make the identification comes
from a consideration like the following: it is well and
good to say that a process is actual when, strictly
speaking, some part of the process is actual. But it is
quite another thing to say that a quantitative property
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of the whole process is actual when only a part of the
process is. We do not say that a circle is actual
when only half of it is. it is the whole process which
is infinite
,
but Aristotle himself says that each stage
of the process is finite, and only some stage of the
process is actual at any given moment.
Such an argument completely misses the point of Ari-
stotle's account. Infinity is a quantitative property,
but it has a peculiar sort of existence, similar to the
existence had, for example, by a quantity of time. The
existence of infinity is quite unlike the sort of exis-
tence had by most other quantitative properties, like
squareness, or weighing six pounds. To say that a square
is actual, or that six pounds is actual, is to say that
some actual thing is actually square, or that some ac-
tual thing actually weighs six pounds. Some quantita-
tive properties have an existence like that of substances
in so far as they exist complete and as a whole at some
particular time. Infinity has an existence like that of
an hour: it does not, and cannot, exist complete and
as a whole at some moment. We say that a table is, not
that it is going on. But if we say that this is (actu-
ally) the hour during which E will occur, we do not mean
that the entire hour actually exists at this moment, but
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that now, this actual moment, falls in the interval of
time during which E will occur. Similarly, when we say
that infinity, (or the infinite) is actual, we are not
saying that a complete infinity is, in its entirety,
actualized now, but that now falls in a time period
during which infinity is being actualized.
It is important to note that whether or not an in-
finite process is in fact carried on indefinitely is
irrelevant in determining whether or not infinity is
actual during the time through which the process is
carried out. That is, if an infinite process, say
halving a line segment, is carried out over some peri-
od of time and then stopped, infinity is actual during
that period of time, and ceases to be actual at the
moment at which the process is terminated. We should
not suppose that a necessary condition for the actuality
of infinity is the actuality of a process which will in
fact be carried on indefinitely.
I think that Hintikka's interpretation of Aristotle
is essentially correct, but he neglects one very inter-
esting feature of infinity. Though it is, it seems to
me, incorrect to attribute to Aristotle the view that
the infinite is never in any sense actual, there can be
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no doubt that infinity has some close connection with
potentiality, a connection somehow stronger than its
connection with actuality. The statement, "There will
not be an actual infinite", (206a20), is hardly ambigu-
ous, and it is repeated at 207bl2, in the discussion
of the infinity of number: "Hence this infinite is
potential, never actual..." Aristotle was trying to
get at something here, and he thought that that some-
thing was important enough to repeat.
Hintikka interprets these claims as attempts to em-
phasize the peculiar nature of the infinite. There is,
and will be, no time at which the infinite exists as
a complete individual. This, I think, is fair enough,
as far as it goes, but considerably more can be said.
Aristotle seems to take the view that a feature u-
i Lque to infinite processes is that there can not be a
time at which the processes have been completed. 40
40. Michael Jubien has pointed out that such a position
assumes that processes are made up of steps in such
a way that there is a bound on how little time can
be consumed by a step. Without this assumption, one
can conceive of a process the first step of which
requires one minute, the second one-half minute, etc.
This will be an infinite process which requires less
than two and one-half minutes to complete.
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For processes in general, this is not the case. Con-
sider the movement of an object, X, from point A to
point B. When X is at A, it has the potential to be at
B, it is potentially at B. The movement of X from A to
B simply is the process of that potentiality becoming
an actuality. As X moves from A toward B, more and more
of its potentiality for being at B is becoming actual-
ized. When X arrives at B, its potentiality for being
at B has been completely actualized. X is no longer
potentially at B at all: it no longer has the poten-
tial for being at B because it is actually at B. Thus,
there is no moment in time at which one can say that
X's potentiality for being at B is actualized in its
entirety, because as long as X is not at B, some of that
potentiality is yet to be actualized, and once X has
arrived at B, the potentiality for being at B ceases to
exist at all, as long as X remains at B. But at any
time after X has arrived at B, it is quite correct to
say that X's potential for being at B has been actual-
ized. And so the process by which X's being at B was
actualized has itself been actualized.
The situation with infinite processes is quite dif-
ferent. The potentiality of which the process is the
actualization is never exhausted. No matter how long
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the process continues, no matter how many tires the
procedure is repeated (in the case of repetitive pro-
cesses, like the division of line segments or the pro-
duction of numbers by the addition of ones), the poten-
tiality remains for the process to continue. No matter
how much of the process has been actualized, there is
potentially more to be actualized. Thus, there can be
no time at which the complete process has been actual-
ized, at which the potentiality has been exhausted.
The infinite will not be actual, then, in so far as it
will never be the case that all of an infinite process
has been actualized.
An infinite process is uncompletable
, and it is of
the essence of an infinite process that there is always
the potential for carrying the process further. This
is why infinity is so closely linked with potentiality.
Thus, Aristotle says:
The infinite turns out to be the contrary
of what it is said to be. It is not what
has nothing outside it that is infinite,
but what always has something outside it.
(Phys
. ,
20 7al ff
)
What are the consequences for mathematics of this
account of infinity? For Geometry, there are no infin-
ite magnitudes, no arbitrarily long lines, either poten-
tially or actually:
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...
magnitudes the contrary holds.at is continuous is divided ad infin-itum, but there is no inf ini te-Tn-thT1direction of increase. For the size
which it can potentially be, it can al-so actually be. Hence since no sensi-ble magnitude is infinite, it is im-possible to exceed every assigned mag-
mtude,- for if it were possible there
would be something bigger than theheavens
.
( Phys .
, 207bl5 ff
)
For Arithmetic, there is no infinity in the sense of
an infinitely large number, either potentially or ac-
tually. m Arithmetic, the infinite is the possibility
of finding (or producing), for any number, a number
larger than it:
It is natural to suppose that in number
there is a limit in the direction of the
minimum, and that in the other direction
every assigned number is surpassed...
The reason is that what is one is indivis-
ible whatever it may be, e.g. a man is one
not many. Number on the other hand is a
plurality of 'ones' and a certain quantity
of them. Hence number must stop at the
indivisible becausa plurality is always
divisible... But in the direction of
largeness it is always possible to think
of a larger number: for the number of
times a magnitude can be bisected is infin-
ite. Hence the infinite is potential,
never actual: the number of parts that can
be taken always surpasses any assigned num-
ber .
(Phys., 207bl)
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The infinity of Arithmetic is dependent upon the
infinity of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of
magnitude guarantees that for any given number, there
is a larger number, at least potentially, despite the
fact that there are only finitely many things in the
universe. For any given number, a number larger than
it exists potentially because it is possible to divide
some magnitude sufficiently to produce segments or
parts whose number exceeds that of the given number.
But there is not, even potentially, an infinitely large
number, and it is impossible that an infinity of num-
bers should ever be actualized.
These views on infinity apparently rule out any
transfinite mathematics. We cannot prove things about
infinite sets or collections
,
because there are no in-
finite sets or collections, even potentially. To talk
about cb is to talk about something which does not exist
in any sense at all. We find here strains of construc-
tivism, (as well as a certain charming common sense)
:
a science cannot deal with something which does not exist,
and the set of natural numbers does not exist even poten-
tially, because it is impossible, even theoretically, to
produce an infinity of numbers.
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The consequences of Aristotle's views on infinity
are, if Hintikka is to be believed, extremely serious
for Geometry. He claims: "Thus we have to conclude
that Aristotle's peculiar doctrine of the existence of
maximal spatial extension made it impossible for him
to justify fully the practice of the geometers of his
time
. Hintikka is driven to this conclusion be-
cause he believes that he can show first, that the
physical space of Aristotle's universe is not strictly
speaking Euclidean, and second, that the theorems of
Geometry can not be universally true. If either of
these two points could be made good, I think it would
be fair to consider it a devastating weakness in Ari-
stotle's philosophy of mathematics. In fact, however,
I think that neither point can be made good.
Hintikka attempts to show that Aristotle's physical
space was non-Euclidean by arguing that Euclid's fifth
postulate, the axiom of parallels, was not satisfied in
the Aristotelian universe. Hintikka quotes Heath's
translation of the fifth postulate as stated by Euclid:
If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes
the interior angles on the same side less than two right
angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely,
meet on that side on which are the angles less than the
41. Aristotelian Infinity", op. cit
.
,
page203.
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two right angles." He then says: "If there is a
maximum to the extent to which lines can be produced,
this postulate fails", 42 and concludes, "if understood
according to the letter of Aristotle's statements, his
physical universe is non-Euclidean: the axiom of paral-
lels is not satisfied in it". 42
If one interprets "this postulate fails" charitably,
one understands Hintikka to be pointing out that the
postulate is vacuously satisfied in a finite universe,
because part of the antecedent, namely, "if produced
indefinitely
,
can not be satisfied. However, if that
is what Hintikka means, he certainly is not entitled
to conclude from the fact that the fifth postulate is
vacuously satisfied, that Aristotelian space is non-
Euclidean.
In fact, there is no difficulty in taking Aristo-
telian space to be Euclidean. The axiom of parallels
can be restated in a form which makes no appeal to ar-
bitrarily large extensions, and there is no reason to
suppose that Aristotle's finite physical space could
not satisfy the axiom non-vacuously . We define paral-
lel lines as follows: Lines a and b are parallel pro-
vided any line intersecting both a and b and perpen-
Ibid
,
page 202.42.
43. Ibid
,
page 203.
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dicular to a, is perpendicular to b. The axiom of
parallels is then stated: For any line, and any point
not on that line, there is exactly one line through
that point parallel to the given line. 44 This, to-
gether with the other postulates, provides us with a
reasonable determination of a Euclidean space.
Hintikka also argues that Aristotle's account of
infinity restricts the universality of the theorems of
Geometry. On page 201, he cites this passage from
Aristotle
:
Our account does not rob the mathematicians
of their study, by disproving the actual exis-
tence of the infinite in the direction of in-
crease, in the sense of the untraversable
. inpoint of fact they do not need the infinite
and do not use it. They postulate only that
the finite straight line may be produced as
far as they wish. It is possible to have di-
vided in the same ratio as the largest quan-
tity another magnitude of any size you like.
Hence, for the purposes of proof, it will make
no difference to them to have such an infinite
instead, while its existence will be in the
sphere of real magnitudes.
(Phys.
,
2 0 7b27 ff
)
44. In fact, the axiom in this simple form will not be
satisfied by every point and every line, without addi-
tional assumptions. There will be lines perpendicular
to a diameter of the universe. The endpoints of that
diameter are such that the only lines through them
parallel to the original line are tangents to the uni-
verse. But these tangents would lie outside, and
hence do not exist. There are various strategies for
remedying this, but we need not concern ourselves with
the complications here.
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Hintikka comments
He is suggesting in effect that all that thegeometer needs is the kind of infinite exten-sion that exists merely as the inverse of in-finite divisibility, and that a geometertherefore does not even need arbitrarily larqepotential extensions...
What Aristotle's statement therefore amountsto is to say that for each proof of a theorem,dealing with a given figure, there is a suffi-
ciently small similar figure for which theproof can be carried out. in short, each geo-
metrical theorem holds in a sufficiently small
neighborhood. From this it does not followhowever, that the theorem really holds. 45
The dispute involved here can best be elucidated in
terms of a specific example. It is a theorem of Geometry
that any triangle inscribed in a semi-circle is a right
triangle. The proof of this theorem involves a construc-
tion, part of which looks like this:
One extends a line from the vertex, C, perpendicular to
the base, AB. This line is extended beyond the base to
a distance equal to the base, which is also the diameter
of the semi-circle.
45. Op. Cit.
,
page 202.
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Now suppose that the circle in question is a cir-
cumference of the universe. The construction involved
m proving that the triangle in this case is a right
triangle requires that a line be extended beyond the
boundary of the universe. But, according to Aristotle,
there is no such line, so the construction cannot be
performed on this figure. From this, Hintikka concludes
that the theorem does not hold for this triangle.
Aristotle's solution is quite simple; he points out
that the construction can be carried out on a similar
but smaller figure, and the truth of the theorem thereby
demonstrated. Hintikka objects that that alternative
construction merely proves that the smaller figure is a
right triangle, and does not establish that the theorem
holds in all cases.
Apparently, Hintikka construes the construction as a
proof that this particular triangle is a right triangle;
the construction proves only a particular conclusion.
The universality of a theorem is derived, it would seem,
from an implicit argument something like this:
1) A is a right triangle because I can perform a cer-
tain construction, C.
2) On any triangle similar to A, I can perform a con-
struction similar to C.
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3) Therefore, any
triangle
.
triangle similar to A is a right
Hintikka's objection is that
,
given Aristotle's account
the second premiss of this argument is false. One can
not always perform the appropriate construction. So the
theorem holds, not universally, but only for those tri-
angles for which the appropriate construction can be per
formed
.
Surely this is not right. When a construction is
carried out, what is demonstrated is that certain prop-
erties of this triangle, (that it is a right triangle),
follow from certain other properties which this triangle
is known to have, (having all three vertices lie on a
circle whose diameter is equal to the base of the tri-
angle). The construction simply shows that these prop-
erties are connected: indeed, that they are necessarily
c nnected. But if this is the case, then it follows
straight way that any triangle with the latter property
has the former, without any appeal to the possibility of
performing constructions in each case. The construction
shows that the properties are necessarily connected, but
the construction itself is not part of, or essential to,
that connection. The properties are necessarily connected
in every case, whether there is actually a construction or
not, whether in fact a construction in that particular
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case is even possible or not.
It seems to me, then, that Hintikka's claim that
Geometry is seriously defective when done within the
strictures of Aristotle's account of infinity is not
adequately supported.
139
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1* Annas
'
Julia. Unpublished manuscript on Ari
stotle's philosophy of mathe-
matics
.
2. Anscombe, G. E. M.
,
and Geach, P. T. Three Phil-
osophers
. Ithaca: Cornell" Uni-
versity Press, 1961.
3. Apostle, Hippocrates G. Aristotle's Philosophy
of Mathematics
. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1952.
4. Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle Translated
fnto English
, (12 vols.) . W. D.
Ross, ed. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1908 - 1952.
Metaphysics
. H. Treaennik, transl.
Cambridge : Harvard University
Press, 1968.
6
* • Physics . Wicksteed and Cornford,
transl. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1970.
7
Barnes, Jonathan. "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstra-
tion". Phronesis
,
vol. XIV, 1969.
Pages 123 - 152.
8. Benacerraf, Paul. "What Numbers Could Not Be".
Philosophical Review
,
vol. LXXIV,
1965. Pages 47 - 73.
9. Bonitz, H. Index Aristotelicus . Akademische
Druck - U. Verlagsanstalt
,
1955.
10.
Charlton, W. Aristotle ' s Physics
,
Books I and II.
Oxford: Clarendon Press
,
1970
.
Nominalistic Systems. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel
,
1970.
11. Eberle, Rolph.
uo
12
.
13 .
14
.
15 .
16 .
17 .
18 .
19 .
2C
\
21 .
22 .
23 .
24 .
Evans
,
Melbourne G. The Physical Philosophy of
Aristotle
. Albuquerque: Univer-
sity of New Mexico Press, 1964.
Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic.
J. L. Austin, transl
. Chicago:
Northwestern University Press.
1968 .
Gow
,
Jame s
.
A Short History of Greek Mathe-
matics
. Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 1884.
Heath, Thomas L. A History of Greek Mathematics.
Oxford: Clarendon Press
,
1921
.
A Manual of Greek Mathematics.
Now York: Dover Publications
,
1353.
The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Ele-
ments. New York: Dover Publica^
-
tions
,
1956.
Hintikka, Jaakko. "Aristotle on the Ambiguity of
Ambiguity". Inquiry
,
vol. II, 1559.
Pages 137 - 151.
• "Aristotelian Infinity". Philosoph-
ical Review, vol. LXXV, 1966. Pares
197 - 218.
"Different Kinds of Equivalence in
Aristotle". Journal of the History
of Philosophy, vol. IX, 1971, Paces
368 - 371.
"Knowledge and Its Object in Plato".
Ajatus
,
vol. XXXIV, 1972.
"On the Ingredients of an Aristotel-
ian Science". Nous
,
vol. VI, 1972.
Pages 55 - 69.
Time and Necessity . Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1973.
Jaeger, Werner W. Aristotle . Richard Robinson, transl.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.
141
25. Kirwan
,
Christopher Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books
G
'
D
'
E
- Oxford: C]arP nHnn
Press, 1971.
26. Love joy
,
Arthur 0. The Great Chain Of Being. Cam-bridge : Harvard University
Press, 1942.
27. Matthews
,
Gareth B. "Aristotelian Explanation". Un-
published manuscript.
28. Mueller Ian
.
"Aristotle on Geometrical Objects"
Archiv fdr Geschichte der Philo-
Sophie, vol. LII
. 1970. P*g^
151 - 171.
29 . Euclid's Elements and the Axiom-
atic Method". British Journal for
Philosophy of Science, vol. XX.
1969. Pages 289 - 309.
30. Organ, Troy W. An Index to Aristotle. New York:
Gordian Press, 1966.
31. Owen, G. E.L. "Aristotle on the Snares of On-
tology " . Phronesis f vol. VII, 1962 .
Pages 69 - 95.
32*
.
"Logic and Metaphysics in Some
Earlier Works of Aristotle". From
Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-
fourth Century
,
Dtiring and Owen
,
Gotegorg, 1960.
33.
.
"The Platonism of Aristotle". Pro-
ceedings of the British Academy")
vol. LI, 1965.
The Doctrine of Being in the Ari-
stotelian Metaphysics . Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Midiaeval
Studies, 1963.
34. Owens, Joesph.
142
35. Patzig, Gtinther. Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 19681
36. Rose, Lynn. "A Reply to Professor Hintikka".
Unpublished manuscript, read at theWestern Division Meetings of the
IS) 7
2^ 0311 Philosophical Association,
37. Ross, w. D. Aristotle. New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1949.
38.
• Aristotle's Metaphysics, text end
commentaries, (2 vols.). Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1924.
39.
• Aristotle's Physics, text and com-
mentaries. Oxford: Clarendon Press
1936.
40. Solmsen
,
Friedrich. Aristotle's System of the Phys-
ical World. Ithaca: Cornell nni-
versity Press, 1960.
41t Wedberg, A. Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics.
Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell,
1955.
42. White, Nicholas. "Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness".
Philosophical Review, vol. LXXX,
1971. Pages 177 - 197-
43. Willing, Anthony. Aristotle on the Paradoxes of Acci-
dence. Ph. D. dissertation. Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst,
1974
,
44. Zeller, Eduard. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatet-
ics . New York: Russell and Russell,
1962.

